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Health Care Civil Rights Under Medicare for All
VALARIE K. BLAKE†
The passage of Medicare for All would go a long way toward curing the inequality that plagues
our health care system along racial, sex, age, health status, disability, and socioeconomic lines.
Yet, while laudably creating a universal right to access to health care, Medicare for All may
inadvertently dampen civil rights protections that are necessary to ensure equality in health care
delivery, an outcome its creators and supporters surely would not intend.
Federal money is typically requisite for civil rights enforcement. Title VI, Title IX, and the Age
Discrimination Act of 1975 all apply to recipients of federal financial assistance. Under Medicare
for All, the federal government becomes the payer, not recipient, of federal funds, leaving it
outside civil rights enforcement unlike private insurers. Additionally, because of historic quirks
in how we interpret civil rights law, Medicare for All may leave health care providers outside of
nondiscrimination mandates altogether.
Medicare for All creates a vacuum in civil rights applicability—one that lawmakers will have to
fill if we want nondiscrimination by doctors and health benefits administrators—but it also
creates an opportunity for lawmakers to reimagine the possibilities of civil rights in health care.
Lawmakers have been none too deliberate about this process in the past, with civil rights being a
byproduct rather than a goal of health reform. With careful planning, Medicare for All can go
beyond retaining the status quo and become a meaningful and intentional civil rights movement
in health care, providing greater access to health care in our country as well as more robust civil
rights protections for patients in the future.

† Valarie K. Blake, J.D., M.A. is a Professor at West Virginia University College of Law. The Author
would like to thank Professors Brietta Clark, Tanya Karwaki, Jessica Roberts, and Lindsay Wiley for thoughts
and commentary. All errors and omissions are the Author’s own. The Author would also like to thank the West
Virginia University College of Law and the Hodges Research Fund for research support.
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INTRODUCTION
The passage of Medicare for All, or a single-payer style health plan of a
similar variety, would be the most significant health policy achievement in this
nation’s history.1 Lives have been lost as a direct result of our broken health care
system.2 Millions of Americans struggle to obtain affordable health care when
they need it.3 Costly care eats up wage growth, leaving a stagnant middle class.4
Each year, American households go into bankruptcy because of unpaid medical
bills, even after the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA).5
Medicare for All would grant Americans a universal right to access care.
This would go a long way toward curing the inequality that plagues our health
care system along racial, sex, age, health status, disability, and socioeconomic
lines. After all, health care is no more immune from the harmful effects of
discrimination than education, employment, or other critical domains. The
segregation of American hospitals during the era of Jim Crow, the flight of
hospitals out of minority neighborhoods, provider refusals to treat patients
because of skin color or HIV status, refusals of health care entities to provide
translators for non-English speakers or auxiliary aids for the deaf, health care
plans designed to deter enrollment by the sick or by pregnant women—all are
very real examples of the discrimination that many populations have faced or
continue to face in obtaining even basic medical care.
Medicare for All might render our health care system more equal in some
ways, by providing universal access to health benefits. At the same time,
Medicare for All may inadvertently dampen civil rights protections that are
necessary to ensure equality in health care delivery, an outcome its creators and
supporters surely would not intend.
How could it be so that Medicare for All would be less protective of our
civil rights in health care? Federal money is typically requisite for civil rights

1. “Medicare for All” and “single-payer” are used interchangeably in this Article. The analysis is not
meant to be confined to any particular bill, although Senator Bernie Sanders’s bill in the Senate (S. 1129) and
Representative Pramila Jayapal’s bill in the House (H.R. 1384) may serve as useful examples. See Medicare for
All Act of 2019, S. 1129, 116th Cong. (2019); Medicare for All Act of 2019, H.R. 1384, 116th Cong. (2019).
2. For a summary of studies demonstrating how health insurance reduces mortality, see Steffie
Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, The Relationship of Health Insurance and Mortality: Is Lack of
Insurance Deadly?, 167 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 424 (2017).
3. Uninsured rates have been steadily rising since 2016, with an uninsured rate of 13.7% at the end of
2018. Dan Witters, U.S. Uninsured Rate Rises to Four-Year High, GALLUP (Jan. 23, 2019),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/246134/uninsured-rate-rises-four-year-high.aspx.
4. Benchmark Employer Survey Finds Average Family Premiums Now Top $20,000, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/press-release/benchmark-employer-survey-findsaverage-family-premiums-now-top-20000/ (“Since 2009, average family premiums have increased 54% and
workers’ contribution have increased 71%, several times more quickly than wages (26%) and inflation (20%).”).
5. David U. Himmelstein, Steffie Woolhandler, Robert M. Lawless, Deborah Thorne & Pamela Foohey,
Medical Bankruptcy: Still Common Despite the Affordable Care Act, 109 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 431 (2019).
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enforcement.6 Title VI,7 Title IX,8 and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975,9
which collectively ban discrimination based on race, color national origin, sex,
and age, all only apply to recipients of federal financial assistance. Federal
money is at the center of all health reforms; each proposal varies based on how
much or how little health care services are subsidized by the federal government
and for whom. Thus, each effort at health reform and each pour of the federal
coffers into health care services has cemented some forms of civil rights
protections for patients (or potentially reduced them). Medicare brought in
hospitals, Medicaid brought in state agencies and their benefit design, and the
ACA brought in private insurers and nondiscrimination based on sex.10
By design, in Medicare for All and plans like it, all health care payments
stem from a single payer, the federal government. But the federal government
as the administrator of those benefits would not automatically be held to account
for civil rights violations, in the way that Medicaid and private insurers currently
are.11 Additionally, because of historic quirks in how we interpret civil rights
laws, even though most doctors and other providers are currently held
accountable under civil rights law, Medicare for All money might actually free
them from accountability.12 Sex discrimination protections could also be lost.13
Medicare for All would create a vacuum in civil rights applicability, one
that lawmakers will have to fill if only to retain the status quo. But this also
makes Medicare for All an opportunity for lawmakers to reimagine the
possibilities of civil rights in health care. In every other health reform in the past,
civil rights laws automatically attached. As a result, lawmakers did not think
about how civil rights should operate in health care. Under Medicare for All,
civil rights inclusion will not be automatic, forcing lawmakers to have a
conversation about how they best are incorporated. As we as a nation embark in
this presidency or the next on still another major effort to reform our health care
system—one that brings federal money exclusively or almost exclusively to the
fore—we have an opportunity to plan for civil rights enforcement at the outset
in a way that not just retains the status quo but improves upon civil rights
protections for all patients.
This Article begins in Part I with the story of civil rights in health care,
which is really the story of major federal health care reforms and their impact
6. For instance, see Title VI’s language: “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. There
are some exceptions, like the Americans with Disabilities Act, which governs specifically enumerated private
entities even when they do not accept federal money under Congress’s Commerce powers. See id. § 12182.
7. Id. § 2000d.
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 6101.
10. See infra Part I.C–E.
11. See infra Part II.B.2.
12. See infra Part II.B.1.
13. See infra Part II.B.4.
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on civil rights. The mechanics of civil rights laws are briefly overviewed before
discussing civil rights implications of Medicare, Medicaid, and the ACA. This
functions as an overview of the status quo of civil rights protections as they
currently exist in our health care system, and the level of safeguards needed to
keep the status quo. Part II explores the implications of Medicare for All and
public options for civil rights enforcement in health care. It introduces the
concepts of single-payer and public option models and provides examples of
such legislation introduced in the 116th Congress. This Part then considers how
Medicare for All, or bridges to it, will change the applicability of civil rights
laws. In this Part, the Article also explains what legislative changes are needed
to a Medicare for All bill to retain existing civil rights protections in health care.
Part III dreams bigger; it considers what it may look like not just to maintain the
status quo but to leverage Medicare for All into a meaningful and intentional
civil rights movement in health care. This Part suggests ways that a Medicare
for All bill could improve upon existing systems to create robust civil rights
protections for patients in the future, while acknowledging the political
challenges of such sweeping reforms.

I. THE STORY OF CIVIL RIGHTS IN HEALTH CARE
The history of civil rights in health care is one of passivity. Despite
widespread systemic racism in medicine, health care was not a major focus of
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which, instead, addressed
discrimination by employers, by recipients of federal funds, and in educational
settings and public accommodations.14 Civil rights were an added bonus, but not
the intention, of the government-financed behemoths that were Medicare and
Medicaid. A steady flow of federal money into hospitals meant the return of a
promise not to discriminate, at first, on the basis of race and, later, on the basis
of other protected statuses. This Part discusses the evolution of civil rights in
health care to date, or how we got to where we are, before turning in the next
Part to how Medicare for All changes this status quo.
A. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAW
This Subpart provides a general overview of how civil rights laws apply:
who they protect, who they govern, what discrimination they prohibit, and how
they are enforced both privately and governmentally. Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which bans race, color, and national origin discrimination in
programs and activities of recipients of qualifying federal financial assistance,15

14. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). For instance, see Title II (public
accommodations), Title IV (public education), Title VI (discrimination in entities receiving federal financial
assistance), and Title VII (employment).
15. “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
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has since become a model for most other civil rights statutes. Title IX, the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, and section
1557 of the ACA all prohibit discrimination by recipients of qualifying federal
financial assistance. Title IX prohibits sex discrimination;16 the Rehab Act
addresses disability discrimination;17 the Age Discrimination Act prohibits age
discrimination;18 and section 1557 prohibits all of these forms of discrimination
by health care entities.19 Other civil rights statutes may govern health care
entities, irrespective of whether they receive federal funds, but these will not be
the focus of this Article as they are not directly impacted by federal health reform
and federal spending.20 Notably, this Subpart uses Title VI for many examples,
because it functions as the model for most other civil rights laws.
1. Protected Classes
Civil rights laws prohibit discrimination by covered entities on the basis of
designated protected traits. While this may vary by statute, generally these laws
prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, age, sex, or
disability. Some statutes forbid discrimination on the basis of religion or exercise
of conscience,21 genetic traits,22 health status,23 or other factors.
Sometimes who qualifies as a protected group is complicated and subject
to interpretation by the courts. For instance, courts and rule-makers alike have
had to interpret whether Title VII’s sex discrimination ban extends to sexual
orientation and gender identity.24
16. “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance . . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
17.
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason
of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or
under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency . . . .
29 U.S.C. § 794.
18. The statute prohibits “discrimination on the basis of age in programs or activities receiving Federal
financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 6101.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 18116.
20. Some civil rights statutes have been passed under Congress’s commerce authority, rather than spending
power. These types of statutes prohibit discrimination by enumerated parties, whether they accept federal money
or not. One example is the Americans with Disabilities Act, which regulates public accommodations including
hospitals, doctors’ offices, and insurance offices. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Such laws would presumably be
untouched by Medicare for All, or similar legislation.
21. See, for example, the Church Amendments, which prohibit the conditioning of federal funds on
willingness to perform abortions or sterilizations. 42 U.S.C. § 300a–7.
22. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008)
(barring genetic discrimination in employment and health insurance).
23. See, for example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which bars some
forms of health status discrimination by group health insurers. 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a).
24. See, for example, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 256–58 (1989), where the Supreme
Court interpreted Title VII to apply to sex stereotyping as a form of sex discrimination. More recently, see
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1753–54 (2020), where Justice Gorsuch held that the plain language
meaning of Title VII must encompass gender identity and sexual orientation discrimination by employers.
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2. Covered Parties
Most civil rights statutes are passed under Congress’s spending authority
and apply to entities that receive federal financial assistance. President John F.
Kennedy, when speaking in favor of the passage of the Civil Rights Act, insisted
that tying nondiscrimination to federal spending was a critical issue of fairness:
Simple justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races
contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches,
subsidizes or results in racial discrimination. Direct discrimination by Federal,
State or local governments is prohibited by the Constitution. But indirect
discrimination, through the use of Federal funds, is just as invidious; and it
should not be necessary to resort to the courts to prevent each individual
violation.25

Using Title VI as an example, the statute defers to each respective agency
to define federal financial assistance for purposes of its own funding streams.26
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the primary agency to
regulate health care, defines federal financial assistance as:
(1) grants and loans of Federal funds, (2) the grant or donation of Federal
property and interests in property, (3) the detail of Federal personnel, (4) the
sale and lease of, and the permission to use (on other than a casual or transient
basis), Federal property or any interest in such property without consideration
or at a nominal consideration, or at a consideration which is reduced for the
purpose of assisting the recipient, or in recognition of the public interest to be
served by such sale or lease to the recipient, and (5) any Federal agreement,
arrangement, or other contract which has as one of its purposes the provision
of assistance.27

Meanwhile, licenses, statutory programs or regulations, programs owned
and operated by the federal government, guaranty and insurance contracts,
procurement contracts, and assistance to ultimate beneficiaries have all
generally not been considered forms of federal financial assistance.28
Additionally, most civil rights statutes only apply to “programs and
activities” of the covered entities. Title VI’s definition of “programs and
activities” is quite expansive and includes operations of departments, agencies,
and local and state governments, as well as corporations, partnerships, private
organizations, and solo proprietorships.29 In the context of health care, the
25. Special Message to Congress on Civil Rights and Job Opportunities, 1 PUB. PAPERS 483, 492 (June 19,
1963).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–1.
27. 45 C.F.R. § 80.13(f) (2019).
28. C.R. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., TITLE VI L EGAL MANUAL sec. V, at 7–11, https://www.justice.gov/
crt/book/file/1364106/download.
29. HHS rules for Title VI define “program” and “activity” as:
all of the operations of—
(1)(i) A department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a
local government; or
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definition is typically not limiting; instead, it is a question of whether the
respective entity accepts federal financial assistance.
3. Discrimination Prohibited
Civil rights statutes generally prohibit intentional discrimination, which
requires a showing that the discrimination was at least partially motivated by the
protected status.30 The protected status need not be the only reason for the
discriminatory conduct, but the discrimination needs to be because of, not in
spite of, its adverse effects on the protected group.31 Disparate impact claims are
also often implicitly recognized in most civil rights statutes.32 These types of
claims require a showing that a facially neutral practice or policy has a
statistically significant discriminatory effect on the protected class.33 Lastly,
claims of retaliation for reporting discrimination are also typically implicitly
recognized, as a form of intentional discrimination.34

(ii) The entity of such State or local government that distributes such assistance and each such
department or agency (and each other State or local government entity) to which the assistance is
extended, in the case of assistance to a State or local government;
(2)(i) A college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher
education; or
(ii) A local educational agency (as defined in 20 U.S.C. 7801), system of vocational education,
or other school system;
(3)(i) An entire corporation, partnership, or other private organization, or an entire sole
proprietorship—
(A) If assistance is extended to such corporation, partnership, private organization, or sole
proprietorship as a whole; or
(B) Which is principally engaged in the business of providing education, health care, housing,
social services, or parks and recreation; or
(ii) The entire plant or other comparable, geographically separate facility to which Federal
financial assistance is extended, in the case of any other corporation, partnership, private
organization, or sole proprietorship; or
(4) Any other entity which is established by two or more of the entities described in paragraph
(g)(1), (g)(2), or (g)(3) of this section; any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance.
45 C.F.R. § 80.13(g).
30. See C.R. DIV., supra note 28, sec. VI, at 2.
31. Id. at 3.
32. See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696–98 (1979) (“Neither [Title VI nor Title IX]
expressly mentions a private remedy for the person excluded from participation in a federally funded program.
The drafters of Title IX explicitly assumed that it would be interpreted and applied as Title VI had been during
the preceding eight years. In 1972 when Title IX was enacted, the critical language in Title VI had already been
construed as creating a private remedy. . . . It is always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives,
like other citizens, know the law; in this case, because of their repeated references to Title VI and its modes of
enforcement, we are especially justified in presuming both that those representatives were aware of the prior
interpretation of Title VI and that that interpretation reflects their intent with respect to Title IX.”) (footnote
omitted).
33. See C.R. DIV., supra note 28, sec. VII, at 2, 18–19.
34. See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 (2005) (“Retaliation against a person
because that person has complained of sex discrimination is another form of intentional sex discrimination
encompassed by Title IX’s private cause of action.”).
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4. Government Enforcement
Enforcement of civil rights laws come in two forms: government
enforcement and private rights of action in the courts. In the context of health
care, most civil rights violations are handled by HHS’s Office for Civil Rights
(herein referred to as OCR).35 Most statutes require assurances by recipients of
federal funds that they will comply with these laws as a condition of receiving
funds.36 OCR can monitor covered entities for compliance and can also receive
and investigate complaints of civil rights violations.37
When there are violations of civil rights laws, OCR typically seeks
informal resolution, meaning that it does not publicly declare that the entity
violated the law. As part of this process, OCR will often generate a Voluntary
Resolution Agreement, in which the covered party agrees to make certain
changes to come into and maintain compliance with the civil rights law, and to
be monitored by OCR with respect to that compliance.38 Where informal
resolution fails, OCR has the ability to formally resolve violations of the law.
They may issue a Letter of Findings that publicly sets forth the violation by the
covered entity.39 OCR may also terminate or freeze federal financial assistance,
though this is typically reserved for more extreme cases of noncompliance.40 For
formal resolution, covered parties are given an opportunity for a hearing before
an administrative law judge with procedural safeguards from the Administrative
Procedures Act.41
5. Private Enforcement
Private rights of action are also available in civil rights law, but typically
only for claims of disparate treatment or retaliation. Private rights of action were
dramatically reduced by Alexander v. Sandoval, in which the Supreme Court
held that litigants cannot bring suits alleging disparate impact under Title VI.42

35. See About Us, OFF. FOR C.R., U.S. DEP ’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Oct. 8, 2019),
https://www.hhs.gov/ocr/about-us/index.html.
36. For example, see HHS rules governing Title VI assurances. 45 C.F.R. § 80.4 (2019).
37. For HHS requirements related to Title VI’s complaint process, see 45 C.F.R. § 80.7.
38. For an example of a Voluntary Resolution Agreement, see RESOLUTION AGREEMENT B ETWEEN U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE FOR CIVIL R IGHTS AND THE UNIVERSITY OF
PITTSBURGH MEDICAL CENTER (2010), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/civilrights/activities/
agreements/upmcra.pdf.
39. See, e.g., OCR Letter of Findings, OFF. FOR C.R., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-providers/compliance-enforcement/examples/aids/at-associates-closureletter/index.html (July 26, 2013).
40. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.8.
41. Id. § 80.9.
42. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001). The Supreme Court held that Title VI does not
permit a private right of action alleging disparate impact, reasoning that while Title II of the Act could be read
to allow for disparate impact claims, Title II lacks rights bearing language in contrast to Title I which clearly
permits private rights for disparate treatment. Id. at 288–93.
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Other courts have since reasoned that the same limitation applies to analogous
civil rights statutes as well.43
When private litigation is available, plaintiffs may seek monetary damages,
declaratory relief, or injunctions; as a general rule, punitive damages are
typically not permitted in civil rights suits.44
Absent clear congressional authorization, lawsuits are generally not
permitted against the federal government, either for its actions or its failure to
enforce civil rights.45 Most civil rights statutes only apply to programs and
activities receiving federal financial assistance, which does not include the
federal government.46 There are a few exceptions. The Rehab Act expressly
applies to recipients of federal financial assistance as well as “any program or
activity conducted by any Executive agency,” which includes programs
conducted by HHS or Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.47 Likewise,
section 1557 of the ACA applies to recipients of federal financial assistance as
well as “any program or activity that is administered by an Executive Agency or
any entity established under this title (or amendments).”48
State actors can also be sued under civil rights laws. The Eleventh
Amendment provides sovereign immunity to insulate states from lawsuits, but
there are exceptions if the state consents to be sued or if Congress clearly
abrogates the state’s immunity under valid powers.49 Congress has been
interpreted to have abrogated state immunity with respect to Title VI, for
example.50
Individuals can also be sued under civil rights statutes, whether private or
public, but generally only in their official capacity.51

43. For the impact of Sandoval on civil rights litigation, see Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Civil
Rights Enforcement in the Modern Healthcare System: Reinvigorating the Role of the Federal Government in
the Aftermath of Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 215 (2003).
44. See C.R. DIV., supra note 28, sec. IX, at 3–5.
45. Id. at 2–3.
46. For example, Title VI’s definition of “programs and activities” refers to state and local government
periodically, but never to the federal government or federal agencies. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.13(g) (2019).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 794.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 18116.
49. C.R. DIV., supra note 28, sec. IX, at 7.
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–7(a) (“(1) A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of . . . title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, or the provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal
financial assistance. (2) In a suit against a State for a violation of a statute referred to in paragraph (1), remedies
(including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such
remedies are available for such a violation in the suit against any public or private entity other than a State.”)
(citations omitted).
51. See C.R. DIV., supra note 28, sec. IX, at 2.
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B. THE IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL RIGHTS FOR PATIENTS
At the time of passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, health care entities
were still widely segregated. Professor David Barton Smith provides a vivid
depiction of what segregation in American medicine looked like at the time:
In many areas, blacks were excluded from the community’s hospitals
altogether. For example, in the 1940s, Broward County Florida had two
hospitals—one municipal and one private—and both excluded the county’s
more than 30,000 black residents from any care. Blacks were also excluded
from white areas of the county by vagrancy laws that permitted local police to
arrest them and put them on work gangs to harvest crops if they could not pay
the heavy fines for violating such laws. In 1940, a gang of white youth bent
on more aggressively policing the streets shot a young black man in the
abdomen. He died without access to hospital care, and an outraged black
community pulled together to create Provident Hospital, a modest thirty-fivebed cottage hospital for blacks. . . .
In the North . . . . care could be just as separate and unequal as in the South,
[though] the way this was achieved in the North was more subtle. In Chicago,
Illinois, for example, almost all black hospitalizations took place either at
Cook County Hospital (Cook County) or the historically black, Provident
Hospital, bypassing many voluntary hospitals that were closer in proximity to
most black neighborhoods. . . . The segregation resulted from the exclusion of
black physicians from the privileges of admitting patients to these hospitals
and the informal understanding of white physicians, who did have such
privileges, about where it was acceptable to admit their black patients. In
1951, a black patient with a skull fracture was turned away from Woodlawn
Hospital in a racially mixed neighborhood, only to die several hours later. This
incident sparked the creation of the Committee to End Discrimination and a
ten-year battle to open staff privileges at the voluntary hospitals to black
doctors.52

Health care, in short, was not immune from discrimination and segregation,
any more than other important areas of life. Even today, decades since the
passage of the Civil Rights Act, discrimination in health care remains. Hospitals
notoriously flee minority neighborhoods, setting up shop in white suburbs and
leaving minority patients without easy access to either acute or primary care.53
Nursing homes remain segregated along racial and socioeconomic lines, with
minorities often residing in lower-resource, lower-quality institutions.54
52. David Barton Smith, Healthcare’s Hidden Civil Rights Legacy, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 37, 39–41 (2003)
(footnotes omitted).
53. See generally Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI: Defending Health Care Discrimination—It
Shouldn’t Be So Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 939 (1990); Brietta R. Clark, Hospital Flight from Minority
Communities: How Our Existing Civil Rights Framework Fosters Racial Inequality in Healthcare, 9 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 1023 (2005); Dayna Bowen Matthew, A New Strategy to Combat Racial Inequality in
American Health Care Delivery, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 793 (2005).
54. Ruqaiijah Yearby, Striving for Equality, but Settling for the Status Quo in Health Care: Is Title VI
More Illusory than Real?, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 429, 454–58 (2007) (detailing ongoing segregation in nursing
homes).
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Providers have refused to treat patients because of their HIV status,55 and refused
to use patients’ gender-affirming pronouns, causing them severe psychological
distress.56 Patients with disabilities encounter a health care system that does not
always accommodate their needs, such as being denied access to auxiliary aids,
like American Sign Language interpreters.57 Insurers, before and after the ACA,
have sought to minimize benefits for mental health and substance abuse or other
costly conditions, or ones perceived as costly.58
These are health inequalities, or avoidable, unnecessary, and unjust59
differences in access to and quality of health care. Over time, they can contribute
to health and health care disparities for certain populations. Such disparities are
well documented in the health policy literature. Take the alarming statistic that
Black women are 2.5 to 3.1 times more likely to die during childbirth than white
or Hispanic women,60 or that racial minorities generally have poorer outcomes
and higher mortality from heart disease, diabetes, breast cancer, stroke, and other
diseases.61 Take the fact that women’s pain is undertreated when compared to
men and discounted as deriving from emotional rather than physical origins,62
or that LGBT individuals are two to three times as likely to attempt suicide and
experience higher rates of substance use and psychiatric disorders.63 Imagine the
barriers for people with disabilities who receive fewer necessary preventative
55. See, e.g., Howe v. Hull, 874 F. Supp. 779, 783 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (alleging disability discrimination on
the basis of HIV where a physician refused to treat the patient, stating that “if you get an AIDS patient in the
hospital, you will never get him out”); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 628–29 (1998) (alleging that a dentist
refused to treat an HIV-positive patient in a regular office setting for fear of infection).
56. Prescott v. Rady Children’s Hosp., 265 F.Supp.3d 1090, 1097 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (suing a hospital under
a section 1557 claim where hospital workers refused to use male pronouns and one worker stated “Honey, I
would call you ‘he,’ but you’re such a pretty girl”); Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-CV-2037
SRN/FLN, 2015 WL 1197415, at *18 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015) (finding plaintiff had successfully alleged sex
discrimination under section 1557 where defendant refused to use preferred pronouns and subjected the patient
to repeated, unnecessary, and painful genital examinations); see also INST. OF MED., THE HEALTH OF LESBIAN,
GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER PEOPLE: BUILDING A FOUNDATION FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING 62
(2011) (reporting on “refusal of treatment by health care staff, verbal abuse, and disrespectful behavior” against
LGBT patients).
57. Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 275–76 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding a successful claim
of disability discrimination where a hospital failed to provide ASL translation to a deaf patient and wife during
course of surgery and post-recovery, forcing minor children to interpret).
58. See generally Valarie K. Blake, Seeking Insurance Parity During the Opioid Epidemic, 2019 UTAH L.
REV. 811 (2019) (cataloguing ways that insurers continue to provide drug treatment below the standards required
by federal laws).
59. Margaret Whitehead, The Concepts and Principles of Equity and Health, 22 INT’L J. HEALTH
SERVS. 429, 431 (1992).
60. Donna L. Hoyert & Arialdi M. Miniño, Maternal Mortality in the United States: Changes in Coding,
Publication, and Data Release, 2018, 69 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REPS., Jan. 30, 2020 (rev. July 15, 2020), at, 1, 5.
61. Martha Hostetter & Sarah Klein, In Focus: Reducing Racial Disparities in Health Care by Confronting
Racism, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/
newsletter-article/2018/sep/focus-reducing-racial-disparities-health-care-confronting.
62. Diane E. Hoffmann & Anita J. Tarzian, The Girl Who Cried Pain: A Bias Against Women in the
Treatment of Pain, 29 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 13, 13 (2001).
63. Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health, OFF. OF DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH
PROMOTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topicsobjectives/topic/lesbian-gay-bisexual-and-transgender-health (last visited Feb. 25, 2021).
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screenings for conditions like breast cancer and cervical cancer64 or the undertreatment of older persons because of misperceptions and generalizations about
their age.65 Now, imagine the care received by individuals who may occupy
more than one of these categories, say a woman of color who is LGBTQ and has
a disability.66
Health and health care disparities are not solely driven by health care
discrimination; broader structural inequalities, unequal access to the social
determinants of health, health care choices, and other factors matter too.67 But
inequalities in our health care system, driven by discrimination, are certainly a
critical component. This discrimination is intolerable in and of itself for the pain
and suffering it unnecessarily generates, by making people less healthy than they
otherwise would be. It is made more so by the reality that health care is so
important for ensuring equal opportunity in our ability to work, to learn, to
engage meaningfully in society.68 Additionally, sociology literature suggests
that individuals who encounter broader societal discrimination are generally
sicker;69 an equal health care system may be important to offset the health harms
of wider systemic injustices in housing, employment, education, and other areas
of life. Given these considerations, civil rights are important for our health and
for equality.
C. MEDICARE AS THE FIRST HEALTH CARE CIVIL RIGHTS BILL
The story of civil rights in health care is told through the various federal
health reform bills that have expanded federal spending into health care and, in
doing so, expanded civil rights protections for patients.
Prior to Medicare, few federal dollars flowed into health care.70 This was
all to change one year after the passage of the Civil Rights Act with the adoption
64. Disability and Health, OFF. OF DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS., https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topics-objectives/topic/disability-and-health (last visited
Feb. 25, 2021).
65. See Joel B. Teitelbaum, Health Care and Civil Rights: An Introduction, 15 ETHNICITY & DISEASE S227, S2-29 (2005).
66. See Chien-Ching Li, Alicia K. Matthews, Frances Aranda, Chirag Patel & Maharshi Patel, Predictors
and Consequences of Negative Patient-Provider Interactions Among a Sample of African American Sexual
Minority Women, 2 LGBT HEALTH 140, 142–44 (2015) (finding that one-third of Black sexual minority women
report a negative experience with a healthcare provider in the last five years and, of these, one-third of women
responded by not seeking medical care when needed the next time).
67. Nancy E. Adler, M. Maria Glymour & Jonathan Fielding, Addressing Social Determinants of Health
and Health Inequalities, 316 JAMA 1641, 1642 (2016).
68. Norman Daniels, Justice, Health, and Healthcare, 1 AM. J. BIOETHICS 2, 3 (2001).
69. See Mark L. Hatzenbuehler, Jo C. Phelan & Bruce G. Link, Stigma as a Fundamental Cause of
Population Health Inequities, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 813, 819 (2013).
70. Sidney D. Watson, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act: Civil Rights, Health Reform, Race, and
Equity, 55 HOWARD L.J. 855, 864 (2012). One exception was the Hill-Burton Act, which provided federal funds
to hospitals to modernize facilities, in return for agreeing not to discriminate on the basis of race, color, national
origin, or creed. 42 U.S.C. § 291e (1946) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 291e (2018)). However, there was an
important exception: “an exception shall be made in cases where separate hospital facilities are provided for
separate population groups, if the plan makes equitable provision on the basis of need for facilities and services
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of Medicare, the federally-funded and administered health care program that
reimburses private providers to deliver care to people aged sixty-five and older.71
Medicare became the necessary precondition for civil rights to apply in health
care to prohibit racial, and later, other forms of discrimination by some health
care entities.
1. Medicare’s History
With the passage of Medicare, the Johnson Administration and the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), the predecessor of HHS,
made clear that at least some Medicare payments would be viewed as a form of
federal financial assistance for purposes of Title VI.72 Although Medicare had
not been designed specifically as a civil rights bill for health care, it led to the
first application of civil rights to health care entities anyway. Legislators and the
Administration understood that federal money extended into health care would
have a happy consequence of requiring covered entities to comply with civil
rights law. As Senator Philip Hart stated during debates over Medicare:
In addition to the new economic independence it will create, I am hopeful
that the bill will promote first-class citizenship in another fashion also. We
decided last year, and wrote into law, that Federal tax funds collected from all
the people may not be used to provide benefits to institutions or agencies
which discriminate on the grounds of race, color, or national origin. This
principle will, of course, apply to hospital and extended care and home health
services provided under the social security system, and will require
institutions and agencies furnishing these services to abide by title 6 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.73

On the eve of Medicare’s implementation, the significance of Title VI
enforcement was on President Johnson’s mind: “Medicare will succeed—if
hospitals accept their responsibility under the law not to discriminate against any
patient because of race . . . . This program is not just a blessing for older
Americans. It is a test for all Americans—a test of our willingness to work
together.”74

of like quality for each such group.” Id. § 291e(f). This exception to permit “separate but equal” health care
facilities was ruled unconstitutional in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 969 (4th Cir.
1963). Even so, Hill-Burton funds were limited in duration, not every entity accepted them, and some health
care entities even considered returning them in order to avoid having to comply with non-discrimination
mandates. Smith, supra note 52, at 49. In short, they did not achieve the same desegregation efforts that Medicare
was to later attain.
71. An Overview of Medicare, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issuebrief/an-overview-of-medicare/?gclid=Cj0KCQiAtrnuBRDXARIsABiN-7CnTTQMeXGuOxFpfeG7VMAj—
16ZL5X_iW0yzvwlajgNcAEWVBTkyYaAg9KEALw_wcB.
72. See Watson, supra note 70, at 860–70 (providing an overview of this history).
73. 111 CONG. REC. 15,813 (1965). Senator Abraham Ribicoff also expressly contemplated that hospitals
would need to comply with Title VI after the passage of Medicare. 111 CONG. REC. 15,803 (1965).
74. DAVID BARTON SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED: RACE AND HEALING A NATION 141 (1999).
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Though at times victory seemed uncertain, by the time Medicare was up
and running, “more than 1,000 hospitals had quietly and uneventfully integrated
their medical staffs, waiting rooms and hospital floors.”75 The same activists
who had fought for civil rights had fought for Medicare, in the name of social
progress, and now, with the passage of Medicare, civil rights had some meaning
in the context of health care too.76 The money was too great, the bargain too
good. Suddenly, large swaths of the health care industry were willing to accept
federal funds, even if it came with a requirement to comply with the Civil Rights
Act and to desegregate along with the rest of American society.77
2. Medicare Brings Health Care Entities Under Civil Rights Laws, with
Less Clarity Regarding Providers and Benefits
Medicare has become the primary vehicle to bring health care entities
under compliance with civil rights laws. Medicare clearly extends civil rights
laws to hospitals and other institutions that accept those funds, but there is less
clarity around discrimination by health care providers, or in health benefits. The
issue turns on whether the party involved counts as a recipient of federal
financial assistance.
a. Health Care Entities
Medicare Part A, or hospital coverage, is the primary form of payment for
health care provided by institutions.78 Part A covers 100% of the cost of inpatient
hospital care, skilled nursing facility care, inpatient care in a skilled nursing
facility, hospice care, and home health care.79 Medicare Part A applies to any
such providers including hospitals, hospices, and skilled nursing facilities.
Medicare notoriously does not cover custodial care or long-term nursing home
care, which has been left to the means-tested Medicaid program.80
Shortly after the passage of Medicare, HEW made clear that Medicare Part
A would count as federal financial assistance in the context of health care.81
Moreover, though redundant given that the laws obligate these entities already,
Medicare regulations require that Part A providers agree to comply with civil
rights laws.82

75. Smith, supra note 52, at 52.
76. Id. at 50.
77. Id. (calling Medicare “in a very real sense, the major unacknowledged gift to the American people of
the Civil Rights Movement”).
78. An Overview of Medicare, supra note 71.
79. What Part A Covers, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/what-part-acovers (last visited Feb. 25, 2021).
80. Id.
81. OFF. FOR C.R., What Qualifies as “Federal Financial Assistance” for Purposes of Civil Rights
Complaints Handled by OCR?, U.S. DEP ’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/forindividuals/faqs/what-qualifies-as-federal-financial-assistance/301/index.html?language=es (Nov. 19, 2015).
82. Section 489.10 reads:

March 2021]

HEALTH CARE CIVIL RIGHTS

789

b. Health Care Providers
While HEW was happy to dub Medicare Part A payments a form of federal
financial assistance, it pulled back the reins on doing the same for Part B
payments. Part B payments are those payments paid to individual providers for
services.83 Part B covers only 80% of the cost of individual provider services,
with individual Medicare beneficiaries paying the other 20% in the form of a
premium.84
It remains true to this day, even after the passage of the ACA, that
individual providers that accept Medicare Part B payments only, and no other
form of federal money, are not governed by civil rights laws.85 The failure to
include individual providers was significant as segregation and inequality in
medicine was at least in part a function of individual providers, as well as
institutions.86
The Agency’s reasoning behind excepting Part B from civil rights
enforcement is convoluted and has changed over time. Right after the passage
of Medicare, HEW’s general counsel published an opinion supporting the stance
that Part B payments are not federal financial assistance by arguing that Part A
payments are federal financial assistance because they pay providers for 100%
of the service, while Part B payments are not because they only pay for a portion
of services.87 HEW’s general counsel described Part B payments as creating a
(b) In order to participate in the Medicare program, the provider must meet the applicable civil
rights requirements of:
(1) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as implemented by 45 CFR part 80, which provides
that no person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under, any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance (section 601);
(2) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as implemented by 45 CFR part 84, which
provides that no qualified handicapped person shall, on the basis of handicap, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or otherwise be subject to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance;
(3) The Age Discrimination Act of 1975, as implemented by 45 CFR part 90, which is designed
to prohibit discrimination on the basis of age in programs or activities receiving Federal financial
assistance. The Age Discrimination Act also permits federally assisted programs and activities, and
beneficiaries of Federal funds, to continue to use certain age distinctions, and factors other than
age, that meet the requirements of the Age Discrimination Act and 45 CFR part 90; and
(4) Other pertinent requirements of the Office of Civil Rights of HHS.
42 C.F.R. § 489.10 (2019); see also Dean M. Harris, Beyond Beneficiaries: Using the Medicare Program to
Accomplish Broader Public Goals, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1251, 1273 n.114 (2003) (observing that the
regulations are duplicative, as institutions are governed by civil rights statutes by virtue of receiving the Part A
funds).
83. What Part B Covers, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/what-part-bcovers (last visited Feb. 25, 2021).
84. An Overview of Medicare, supra note 71.
85. OFF. FOR C.R., supra note 81.
86. See Smith, supra note 52, at 53.
87. See Memorandum from Alanson W. Willcox, Gen. Couns., Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, to
Robert M. Ball, Comm’r, Soc. Sec. (Oct. 18, 1965), in U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES IN HEALTH
CARE DELIVERY 867, 868–71 (1980).
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right of the ultimate beneficiary of Medicare services to receive at least 80% of
their services covered, as compared with Part A where the right accrues to the
providers to have all of their costs of delivering care reimbursed.88
HEW reasoned that because Title VI does not apply to the ultimate
beneficiaries of federal financial assistance, for instance those who receive
social security payments, then Title VI should not apply to Part B recipients.89
Additionally, HEW justified the difference in treatment because Part B is
sometimes provided directly to the beneficiary, unlike other forms of federal
financial assistance.90 However, as these payments are also sometimes provided
directly to health care providers, just like Part A, the distinction seemed tenuous
at best.
In a 1966 memo, HEW’s general counsel moved away from its overly
narrow earlier rationale, but still maintained that Part B payments are not federal
financial assistance.91 HEW rejected its earlier stance, stating “[t]here is no basis
in the text of [Title VI] for an assumption that net economic benefit to the payee
of the Federal funds is a necessary or even relevant factor in determining what
is ‘Federal financial assistance.’”92 Instead, HEW reasoned, Part A payments
should be considered federal financial assistance because they are designed to
finance the program or activity of a non-Federal institution or agency; thus they
should be within the scope of Title VI even if there is no element of financial
benefit to the recipients.93
In a brief footnote, HEW precluded Part B payments from federal financial
assistance, arguing that Part B payments are contracts of insurance, unlike Part
A payments.94 Title VI exempts from federal financial assistance “contract[s] of
insurance or guaranty.”95 The opinion provided no rationale for the distinction
between Parts A and B in this manner other than that Part B is a “voluntary
insurance system” and “is truly contractual in nature.”96 This argument is
particularly weak given that the legislative history of Title VI clearly states that
in including the term “contracts of insurance” it meant to exclude home
mortgages obtained from federally insured institutions from civil rights
enforcement, such as mortgages one would obtain through Fair Housing
88. Id. at 869.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 870 n.2.
91. Memorandum from Alanson W. Willcox, Gen. Couns., Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, to Robert
M. Ball, Comm’r, Soc. Sec. (Dec. 30, 1966), in U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., supra note 87, at 872, 872–80.
92. Id. at 873.
93. Id. at 874.
94. Id. at 879 n.10.
95. 42 U.S.C § 2000d–1.
96. Memorandum, supra note 91, at 879 n.10. In the 1966 memorandum, HEW’s general counsel discusses
in more detail what HEW considers “contractual” in the context of Part A. Specifically, HEW states that rights
to Part A funds are statutory, not contractual, and that statutory social insurance is not a “contract of insurance”
as determined by the Supreme Court in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). HEW contrasts Part B as truly
contractual, akin to war risk insurance policies that were held to be contracts in Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S.
571 (1934). See id. at 877–79.
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Administration loans.97 Moreover, Medicare payments of any kind could not
have been in the minds of the legislators, as Medicare was passed a year later.98
Ultimately, Medicare officials were seeking to steer clear of allegations
that they were interfering in the practice of medicine. Hospitals were different
but the practice of medicine was clearly a state-governed function, as well as a
matter for professional self-regulation.99 As Smith puts it:
[T]he reality was that it would have been almost impossible to define what
Title VI compliance meant for physician practices, and it would have been
impossible to enforce. Nevertheless, Title VI compliance for hospitals would
be meaningless without the ability to exert some control over the referral
patterns of physicians. Physicians could, as they had done in Chicago, simply
selectively refer their white and black patients to different hospitals
maintaining de facto segregation.100

Unlike Medicare Conditions of Participation that require hospitals to attest
to compliance with civil rights laws,101 no such obligation is present in the
provision of the Medicare Act that applies to individual providers.102 It would
take enforcement of Medicaid, and other federal programs, to bring providers
under the umbrella of civil rights.103
c.

Health Care Benefits

Public health insurance programs, just like any other health insurance
benefits, can sometimes raise issues of discrimination. Discrimination is much
more common in private, for-profit health insurance however, where insurers’
profits and need to compete by price drive a need for classification. Insurers,
absent regulation, may be prone to discriminate when deciding whether to enroll
a certain individual into insurance, what premiums they charge the individual,
and what benefits are offered to that individual.104 Some of these forms of
discrimination are inapplicable in public programs. Public programs generally
cannot discriminate when deciding who to enroll, the cost of premiums, and

97. Letter from Eileen M. Stein, Gen. Couns., U.S. Cmm’n on C.R., to Louis Nunez, Staff Dir., U.S.
Cmm’n on C.R. (Oct. 7, 1980), in U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., supra note 87, at 851, 855–57 (citing testimony of
Senator John Pastore explaining the “contracts of insurance” amendment to Title VI, 110 CONG. REC. 13,435–
36 (1964)).
98. Id. at 855.
99. Smith, supra note 52, at 53.
100. Id. Smith adds to this rationale elsewhere. SMITH, supra note 74, at 162 (“As to the political realities
at the time of the passage of Medicare, imposing any kind of Title VI requirements on medical practices was
inconceivable. Local medical societies, state societies, and the AMA were powerful political forces and
reluctant, if not openly hostile, participants in the Medicare program.”).
101. See supra note 82.
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc.
103. See supra Part III.D.
104. For examples of discrimination in individual private insurance markets, see KAREN POLLITZ, RICHARD
SORIAN & KATHY THOMAS, KAISER FAM. FOUND., HOW ACCESSIBLE IS INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE FOR
CONSUMERS IN L ESS-THAN -PERFECT HEALTH? (2001), https://www.kff.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/howaccessible-is-individual-health-insurance-for-consumer-in-less-than-perfect-health-report.pdf.
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what benefits to offer, as these standards are set forth by statute. However,
insurance benefit design can still sometimes operate in ways that disadvantage
protected classes. For instance, a public program might choose not to cover a
benefit in a way that arguably treats a group differently based on protected status,
such as choosing not to cover gender transition therapies105 or limiting eligibility
for a certain medical procedure to people below a certain age.
Medicare itself, as an administrator of health benefits, is not accountable to
nondiscrimination mandates and aims, though. Many of the federal civil rights
statutes do not govern the federal government; instead they only apply to
recipients of federal financial assistance.106 The Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) indicates that it complies with nondiscrimination
mandates for race, color, national origin, sex, age, and disability, though it is
unclear how to legally hold the agency accountable for this promise.107 Lawsuits
are generally not permitted against the federal government, either for its actions
or its failure to enforce civil rights.108 The Rehab Act and section 1557 govern
programs and activities conducted by HHS (thus including activities of the
CMS).109 However, the former is limited to disability claims and the latter only
applies so long as the ACA is the governing law.
Instead, Medicare is held accountable for discriminatory benefit design in
two ways that are outside the scope of civil rights laws. One, injured parties may
make constitutional claims, where applicable.110 Two, Medicare, as a provider
of health benefits, is subject to an inter-agency appeals process over its benefits
determinations.111 What benefits Medicare covers are determined by National
Cover Determinations (NCDs) or Local Coverage Determinations (LCDs) that
consider medical effectiveness and other factors.112 Through this process,

105. See infra notes 108–113 and accompanying text.
106. For example, Title VI, Title IX, and the Age Discrimination Act all only apply to recipients of federal
financial assistance. See supra notes 15–19, 25 and accompanying text.
107. CMS’s nondiscrimination notice provides that
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is the federal agency that runs the Medicare,
Medicaid, and Children’s Health Insurance Programs, and the federally facilitated Marketplace.
CMS doesn’t exclude, deny benefits to, or otherwise discriminate against any person on the basis
of race, color, national origin, disability, sex, or age in admission to, participation in, or receipt of
the services and benefits under any of its programs and activities, whether carried out by CMS
directly or through a contractor or any other entity with which CMS arranges to carry out its
programs and activities.
Accessibility & Nondiscrimination Notice, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/about-us/accessibilitynondiscrimination-notice (last visited Feb. 25, 2021).
108. See C.R. DIV., supra note 28, sec. IX, at 2–3.
109. See supra notes 17, 19 and accompanying text.
110. For example, a litigant might sue the federal government if the litigant believed a Medicaid benefit
coverage violated the Equal Protection clause for, say, treating people of varied races or sexes differently.
111. See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S DEP ’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
MEDICARE APPEALS (2020), https://www.medicare.gov/Pubs/pdf/11525-Medicare-Appeals.pdf.
112. For more on the process of national coverage determination appeals, see National Coverage
Determination Complaints, U.S DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/dab/
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complainants can sometimes reach benefits exclusions that are discriminatory.
For instance, until 2014, Medicare had a NCD that banned coverage of
“transsexual surgery.”113 The NCD was based on medical evidence compiled in
1981 that determined the procedure to be “experimental” with high rates of
serious complications.114 The exclusion was overturned by the recommendation
of the HHS Departmental Appeals Board (DAB) after the DAB found the
exclusion to be based on outdated science.115 Experts presented evidence that
the treatment was no longer experimental, that the surgery is generally safe, and
that the surgery is an important treatment for some patients experiencing gender
identity disorder. CMS agreed, lifting the national ban on coverage and making
gender transition surgery now available on a case-by-case basis.116 Notably,
though, this effort was made successful by framing the NCD as outdated science
though. This may not always be an available approach for benefit determinations
that differentially harm a protected group.
While CMS generally is not covered by civil rights laws, Medicare has,
over time, developed roles for private insurers, who are covered by these laws.
In Medicare Part C (or the managed care arm of Medicare), Medicare
beneficiaries have the option to enroll in private insurance plans to receive their
Medicare Parts A, B, and D services.117 Additionally, Medicare Part D covers
prescription drugs and is also managed through contracts with private
insurers.118 Insurers that provide Medicare Part C or Part D plans are recipients
of federal financial assistance. As such, they must also comply with civil rights
laws.119
The importance of Medicare to civil rights in health care cannot be
overstated. Medicare was the bait that caught hospitals, long term acute care
facilities, community hospitals, and other health care entities, and holds them
responsible for protecting civil rights of all patients, whether Medicare recipients
or not. Other laws, including Medicaid and the ACA, have built on Medicare’s
foundation.

different-appeals-at-dab/appeals-to-board/national-coverage-determination-complaints/index.html (Oct. 2,
2016).
113. Access to Healthcare: Non-Discrimination, U.S DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/programs/topic-sites/lgbt/accesstohealthcare/nondiscrimination/index.html (Aug. 15,
2017).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. An Overview of Medicare, supra note 71.
118. Id.
119. OFF. FOR C.R., supra note 81.
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D. MEDICAID BUILDS ON MEDICARE’S PROGRESS
Medicaid was passed at the same time as Medicare but, from its passage, it
has always been under greater threat than Medicare.120 A means-tested program,
the original Medicaid program provided health care to the “deserving poor,” or
individuals who were income eligible and satisfied other statutory mandates like
being blind or deaf, or having children.121 Medicaid is a federal and state funded
program, administered by the states.122
1.

Medicaid Expands Civil Rights Laws’ Reach over Health Care
Providers and Medicaid Benefits

Medicaid adds two distinct and additional layers of civil rights protection
to health care apart from that offered by Medicare: (1) application to providers
and (2) the ability to challenge discrimination in benefit design. However,
Medicaid is limited, too, in that it offers lower reimbursement rates than
Medicare so more providers and entities may participate in Medicare than
Medicaid.123
a. Health Care Providers
While Medicare Part B payments are not viewed as federal financial
assistance for the purposes of civil rights laws, Medicaid payments (as well as
some other federal programs like Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP))
are.124 Thus, individual providers that choose to accept Medicaid payments are
governed by civil rights statutes. HHS, when promulgating rules for section
1557 of the ACA in 2016, nonetheless estimated that most health care providers
are covered under civil rights laws because, even though Medicare Part B does
not count as federal financial assistance, most providers accept Medicaid or
some other form of federal financial assistance.125 HHS made this estimate based
on the fact that about 614,000 physicians accept Medicaid payments (based on
2010 Medicaid Statistical Information System data). This accounts for about
72% of the licensed physicians in the country.126 HHS also noted that physicians
might participate in other programs that constitute federal financial assistance,
like CHIP.127 Taking these physicians into account, HHS estimated that “almost
120. See generally Nicole Huberfeld, The Universality of Medicaid at Fifty, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L.
& ETHICS 67 (2015).
121. Id. at 69–70.
122. See id. at 71, 78.
123. See id. at 71.
124. See OFF. FOR C.R., supra note 81.
125. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376, 31,445–46 (May 18, 2016)
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92).
126. They estimated there were 850,000 licensed physicians in the United States at the time. Id. at 31,446.
127. Examples HHS provided of other federal financial assistance that health providers accept include
funding from: National Health Service Corps, HRSA-funded community health centers, National Institutes of
Health (NIH) research grants, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) funded
programs, and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) gain-sharing demonstration projects. Id.
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all practicing physicians in the United States are reached by [civil rights laws]
because they accept some form of Federal remuneration or reimbursement apart
from Medicare Part B.”128 Medicaid, as the next most common federal funding
program, is the primary vehicle to hold providers accountable under civil rights
laws.
b. States as Providers of Health Care Benefits
Medicaid and its administrators, unlike Medicare, are subject to civil rights
laws. First, they are recipients of federal financial assistance, in that they receive
funds from the government to pay for Medicaid services.129 Second, civil rights
laws abrogate state immunity with respect to Title VI, Title IX, and the
Rehabilitation Act, allowing state Medicaid agencies to be sued under civil
rights laws.130
For one example of the benefits of such litigation, see Alexander v. Choate,
where the Supreme Court reviewed the actions of a state Medicaid agency after
it decided to cut annual covered inpatient hospital stays from twenty days to
fourteen days. 131 Medicaid beneficiaries with disabilities sued the state, arguing
that the cuts would have a disparate impact on people with disabilities who
disproportionately rely on hospital care when compared to the non-disabled.132
The plaintiffs were ultimately unsuccessful in part because the Court was
hesitant to conclude that the Rehab Act allows for challenges related to the
content of the benefits, as opposed to just access; however, the claim and ones
like it are nonetheless important.133 Instead, the Court was highly deferential to
the state, in accordance with the Medicaid Act, to have “substantial discretion to
choose the proper mix of amount, scope, and duration limitations on coverage,
as long as care and services are provided in ‘the best interests of the
recipients.’”134 While the challenge was ultimately unsuccessful, at least it was
permitted. Litigants were able to bring the action and ask the Court to decide if
the state actions were unlawful. Plaintiffs could have been successful, for
instance, if they could show that the discrimination was intentional or had a
disparate impact on people with disabilities.135 The same type of claim would
not be possible against Medicare as a provider of benefits, as it is not a recipient
of federal financial assistance and is insulated from litigation.

128. Id.
129. See OFF. FOR C.R., supra note 81.
130. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
131. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 289–90 (1985).
132. Id. at 290–91.
133. Id. at 292–300.
134. Id. at 303 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19) (1976)).
135. Id. at 297 (observing that the Rehab Act would “ring hollow if the resulting legislation could not rectify
the harms resulting from action that discriminated by effect as well as by design” but concluding that
discrimination was not present in this case because people with disabilities and people without are given the
same exact benefit—fourteen covered hospital days).
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Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring provides another example.136 In Olmstead,
two Medicaid recipients with intellectual disabilities and psychiatric disorders
were institutionalized in a psychiatric unit in a hospital in Georgia, despite their
health care providers believing they were better suited to receive treatment in
community-based programs.137 The plaintiffs sued state officials for failing to
place them in community-based programs, arguing the state agency had
discriminated against them on the basis of disability.138 State officials defended
that their actions were motivated by a tight budget rather than disability
discrimination.139 The Court ultimately decided that segregation of individuals
in institutionalized settings when community-based integration is possible is
discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the ADA.140 The Court
required state Medicaid agencies to offer “a comprehensive, effectively working
plan for placing qualified persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive
settings, and a waiting list that moved at a reasonable pace.”141 The litigation
produced tangible benefits for patients who were now much more likely to be
able to obtain community-based services. Subsequent plaintiffs have
successfully analogized from this case in order to secure rights to some forms of
home-based and community-based Medicaid services that are necessary to
prevent them from becoming institutionalized.142 For instance, plaintiffs have
successfully challenged limits on prescription drug offerings143 and adult day
care offerings144 by arguing that failure to adequately cover these benefits places
individuals at risk of institutionalization, in violation of disability
antidiscrimination laws.
Medicaid benefit challenges are much more robust than challenges to
benefit design under Medicare because of the availability of civil rights laws. In
Medicare, patients are limited to framing discrimination through a lens of
outdated medical evidence, which may not always capture all forms of
discrimination, or through a constitutional challenge. In contrast, Medicaid
litigants are able to use the full sweep of civil rights to challenge discriminatory
benefit design.

136. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
137. Id. at 593.
138. Id. at 593–94.
139. Id. at 594–95.
140. Id. at 601–04.
141. Id. at 605–06.
142. “[W]hile it is true that the plaintiffs in Olmstead were institutionalized at the time they brought their
claim, nothing in the Olmstead decision supports a conclusion that institutionalization is a prerequisite to
enforcement of the ADA’s integration requirements.” Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., 335 F.3d 1175, 1181
(10th Cir. 2003).
143. Id. at 1182.
144. Brantley v. Maxwell-Jolly, 656 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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SECTION 1557 OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AS THE LATEST CIVIL
RIGHTS ACHIEVEMENT

If Medicare and Medicaid created the conditions necessary to bring civil
rights into the field of health care, then the Affordable Care Act serves to fill in
many of the important gaps that remained.
The ACA, unlike Medicare and Medicaid, has an express civil rights
provision, section 1557. Section 1557 provides that:
(a) In general—Except as otherwise provided for in this title (or an
amendment made by this title), an individual shall not, on the ground
prohibited under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972, the Age Discrimination Act of 1975,
or section 794 of title 29, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any health program or
activity, any part of which is receiving Federal financial assistance, including
credits, subsidies, or contracts of insurance, or under any program or
activity that is administered by an Executive Agency or any entity established
under this title (or amendments). The enforcement mechanisms provided for
and available under such title VI, title IX, section 794, or such
Age Discrimination Act shall apply for purposes of violations of this
subsection.145

1.

Section 1557 Expands Civil Rights Enforcement to Private Insurers

Perhaps most significantly, the ACA extends federal money to private
insurers through subsidies to income-qualifying individuals to offset the cost of
premiums and copays. Section 1557 expressly applies to recipients of “credits,
subsidies, or contracts of insurance.”146 With these subsidies and section 1557,
private insurers who were traditionally left out of civil rights enforcement are
now considered recipients of federal financial assistance.
Private insurers were a particular source of discrimination prior to the
ACA, especially in individual markets where insurers might outright exclude
individuals from coverage on the basis of health status, or might subject them to
harsh benefit restrictions or sky-high premiums.147 The ACA imposed a number
of market-based reforms aimed at eliminating health status discrimination in
insurance markets. For instance, the ACA banned discrimination on the basis of
pre-existing conditions in enrollment, leveling premiums across the insureds
except in a few limited instances and providing a baseline level of benefits that
all insurers must offer.148
Section 1557 has proven a powerful tool, as well, in tackling insurance
discrimination that is rooted in protected class discrimination. The Obama-era
145. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
146. Id.
147. See POLLITZ ET AL., supra note 104, at iii–iv.
148. Summary of the Affordable Care Act, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 25, 2013), https://www.kff.org/
health-reform/fact-sheet/summary-of-the-affordable-care-act/.
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rule interprets section 1557 to apply to all offerings of an insurer if the insurer
receives any federal subsidies.149 Thus, if an insurer offers even one plan on the
federal or state ACA insurance exchanges, it is accountable to civil rights laws
for all of the plans it offers or administers on or off the exchanges. The Trump
Administration rolled this back in its section 1557 rule by taking the position
that the language in section 1557 only permits it to apply to insurers’ plans
offered on the exchanges, while any plans they offer or administer outside of the
exchanges are not accountable for complying with section 1557.150
Section 1557 also allows enforcement of civil rights laws against Medicare
and CMS, as a public insurance plan. Section 1557 covers “any program or
activity that is administered by an Executive Agency or any entity established
under [Title I of the ACA].”151 Obama-era rulemakers concluded that HHS “is
not covered as a federally assisted program, although the Department is covered
by the rule as an administrator of health programs and activities. . . . [A]ll parts
of the Medicare program are a health program or activity.”152 Section 1557 thus
reached any program that HHS administered, including public insurance
programs under CMS like Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, and the Indian Health
Service.153 Under the Trump Administration, officials excluded these public
insurance programs by reading section 1557’s language to include only
programs established or administered under Title I of the ACA or, basically, just
the insurance marketplaces.154
149. “For an entity principally engaged in providing or administering health services or health insurance
coverage or other health coverage, all of its operations are considered part of the health program or activity,
except as specifically set forth otherwise in this part.” 45 C.F.R. § 92.4 (2016) (emphasis added).
150. 45 C.F.R. § 92.3(b) (2019) (“‘[H]ealth program or activity’ encompasses all of the operations of entities
principally engaged in the business of providing healthcare that receive Federal financial assistance as described
in paragraph (a)(1) of this section. For any entity not principally engaged in the business of providing healthcare,
the requirements applicable to a ‘health program or activity’ under this part shall apply to such entity’s operations
only to the extent any such operation receives Federal financial assistance as described in paragraph (a)(1) of
this section.”); see also id. § 92.3(c) (“[A]n entity principally or otherwise engaged in the business of providing
health insurance shall not, by virtue of such provision, be considered to be principally engaged in the business
of providing healthcare.”)
151. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a).
152. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376, 31,383–85 (May 18, 2016)
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92).
153. See MaryBeth Musumeci, Jennifer Kates, Lindsey Dawson, Alina Salganicoff, Laurie Sobel &
Samantha Artiga, The Trump Administration’s Final Rule on Section 1557 Non-Discrimination Regulations
Under the ACA and Current Status, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.kff.org/racial-equityand-health-policy/issue-brief/the-trump-administrations-final-rule-on-section-1557-non-discriminationregulations-under-the-aca-and-current-status/. The rule also includes Title I entities, like the insurance
exchanges. See id.
154. 45 C.F.R. § 92.3 (2019). The new rule states that it applies to: “(2) Any program or activity
administered by the Department under Title I of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; or (3) Any
program or activity administered by any entity established under such Title.” Id. In the preamble, the Agency
argues that the language of the statute is unclear and has to be narrowed, so as to not sweep up Agency action
beyond the field of health care.
In resolving the sentence’s ambiguity, however, the Department no longer agrees with the 2016
Rule’s decision to add a limiting modifier (i.e., “health”) that Congress did not include in the
statutory text. Instead, the Department concludes that Congress had already placed a limitation in

March 2021]

HEALTH CARE CIVIL RIGHTS

799

The Obama-era rule specifically forbade discriminatory insurance design,
stating that covered insurers must not:
Deny, cancel, limit, or refuse to issue or renew a health-related insurance
plan or policy or other health-related coverage, or deny or limit coverage of a
claim, or impose additional cost sharing or other limitations or restrictions on
coverage, on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, age, or disability.155

The Obama-era rule warned that blanket exclusions of particular benefits
may be discriminatory.156 Rulemakers also provided examples of potentially
discriminatory benefit design, for instance a “plan that covers inpatient treatment
for eating disorders in men but not women” or “a plan that covers bariatric
surgery in adults but excludes such coverage for adults with particular
developmental disabilities.”157
The Obama-era rule also provided concrete protections against
discrimination by insurers on the basis of gender identity. The rule forbade
insurers from denying or limiting “health services that are ordinarily or
exclusively available to individuals of one sex, to a transgender individual based
on the fact that the individual’s sex assigned at birth, gender identity, or gender
otherwise recorded is different from the one to which such health services are
ordinarily or exclusively available.”158 For instance, an insurer could not
justifiably deny coverage of cervical cancer screening to a transgender male.
Additionally, the rule forbade categorical exclusions of gender transition
services,159 based on the idea that such limits are rooted in bias and old studies
that have been proven incorrect.160 Notably, the safeguards for gender identity

the text of Section 1557 by applying the statute to any program or activity administered by an
Executive Agency “under this title” (meaning Title I of the ACA), as well as to any program or
activity administered by an entity established under such title. The Department believes that either
this interpretation of the statutory text, or the 2016 Rule’s addition of the modifier “health,” is
necessary in order to make sense of the statutory text; this final rule offers a technical reading of
the text that is at least as reasonable as the 2016 Rule’s addition of a word not present in the text
of the statute.
Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Care Education Programs or Activities, Delegation of Authority, 85
Fed. Reg. 37,160, 37,170 (June 19, 2020) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 438, 440, 460; 45 C.F.R. pt. 86, 92,
147, 155, 156).
155. 45 C.F.R. § 92.207(b)(1) (2016). Additionally, covered insurers must not use marketing practices or
benefit designs that discriminate. Id. § 92.207(b)(2).
156. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,429.
157. Id.
158. 45 C.F.R. § 92.206 (2016).
159. Id. § 92.207(b)(4)–(5).
160.
[M]any health-related insurance plans or other health-related coverage, including Medicaid
programs, currently have explicit exclusions of coverage for all care related to gender dysphoria or
associated with gender transition. Historically, covered entities have justified these blanket
exclusions by categorizing all transition-related treatment as cosmetic or experimental. However,
such across-the-board categorization is now recognized as outdated and not based on current
standards of care.
Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,429 (footnotes omitted).
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discrimination were uncertain, even while the Obama-era rules applied, as a
court vacated the part of the rule that considers gender identity a form of sex
discrimination.161 The meaning of sex discrimination under section 1557 has
been a point of controversy.162 The Trump-era draft rule eliminated all of the
specific guidance on what counts as insurance discrimination, leaving the issue
to OCR and the courts.
2.

Section 1557 Stops Short of Covering Medicare Part B Providers

Section 1557 applies to health care entities in much the same way as
Medicare and Medicaid. Again, the rule makers have stopped short of applying
civil rights laws to providers that are recipients of Medicare Part B payments.
Commenters to the Obama-era rulemaking process asked HHS to reverse this
historical position, given that section 1557 expressly includes recipients of
“contracts of insurance” under its covered parties.163 Recall that one of the bases
for why HEW had historically excluded Part B Medicare payments from the
definition of federal financial assistance was because they considered Part B
payments to be contracts of insurance.164 In section 1557, rulemakers declined
to change this position, stating that this rule was not the time to overturn the
long-held position held by HHS while offering no further substantive rationale
for this stance.165
However, the section 1557 rulemakers argued this would have a de minimis
impact on the issue of provider discrimination, as most providers accept some
other form of federal financial assistance, whether Medicaid or CHIP payments,
or special federal grant programs.166 Rulemakers stressed that insurers that are
covered parties under section 1557 have an obligation to ensure compliance with
the civil rights law with respect to the treatment of their enrollees.167 However,
it is unclear how or if insurers enforce civil rights protections against health care
providers.
The Trump-era draft rule also failed to include Medicare Part B as a form
of federal financial assistance while also offering minimal rationale, thus leaving

161. Franciscan All., Inc. v. Azar, 414 F. Supp. 3d 928, 928 (N.D. Tex. 2019); see supra Part I.E.3.
162. See supra Part I.E.3.
163. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,383.
164. See supra notes 91–97 and accompanying text.
165. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,383.
166. See supra notes 124–128 and accompanying text. For instance, at the time of the Obama-era rule, many
doctors accepted meaningful use payments to help develop their use of electronic medical records and this
counted as federal financial assistance. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at
31,445. The meaningful use program ended in 2018, however, and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid renamed
the program and changed the focus to different measurements related to electronic health records.
Interoperability Programs, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms (last visited Feb. 25, 2021).
167. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,383.
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health care providers out of civil rights enforcement unless they accept other
forms of federal financial assistance.168
3. Section 1557 Prohibits Sex Discrimination
Almost fifty years after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, sex
finally became a form of prohibited discrimination in health care. Section 1557
of the ACA achieves this by expressly extending Title IX to health programs
and activities.169 Title IX previously did not extend to health care entities as it
only prohibits sex discrimination by “any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”170
Section 1557 prohibits “under . . . title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972 . . . be[ing] excluded from participation in, [] denied the benefits of, or
[] subjected to discrimination” by covered health programs, including providers
and insurers.171
The Obama-era rule defined “on the basis of sex” broadly, including
“discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, false pregnancy, termination of
pregnancy, or recovery therefrom, childbirth or related medical conditions, sex
stereotyping, and gender identity.”172 The rule failed to expressly cover
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, however, but noted this type of
conduct should be considered a form of sexual stereotyping.173 The Northern
District of Texas vacated the Obama-era rule with respect to its ban on
discrimination based on gender identity and termination of pregnancy.174 The
court held that to include these issues as forms of sex discrimination was a

168. Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities, Delegation of Authority,
85 Fed. Reg. 37,160, 37,174 (June 19, 2020) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R pt. 438, 440, 460; 45 C.F.R. pt. 86, 92,
147, 155, 156) (“As for Medicare Part B, it is not Federal financial assistance. This remains unchanged from the
2016 Rule, which also determined that Medicare Part B was not Federal financial assistance under Section
1557.”) (footnote omitted).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 18116.
170. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 18116.
172. 45 C.F.R. § 92.4 (2016). Gender identity is defined as:
an individual’s internal sense of gender, which may be male, female, neither, or a combination of
male and female, and which may be different from an individual’s sex assigned at birth. The way
an individual expresses gender identity is frequently called “gender expression,” and may or may
not conform to social stereotypes associated with a particular gender.
Id. Sex stereotypes means:
stereotypical notions of masculinity or femininity, including expectations of how individuals
represent or communicate their gender to others, such as behavior, clothing, hairstyles, activities,
voice, mannerisms, or body characteristics. These stereotypes can include the expectation that
individuals will consistently identify with only one gender and that they will act in conformity with
the gender-related expressions stereotypically associated with that gender. Sex stereotypes also
include gendered expectations related to the appropriate roles of a certain sex.
Id.
173. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376, 31,389 (May 18, 2016) (to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92).
174. Franciscan All., Inc. v. Azar, 414 F. Supp. 3d 928, 928 (N.D. Tex. 2019).
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violation of both the Administrative Procedure Act and Religious Freedom
Restoration Act.175 The Trump Administration repealed the Obama-era rule’s
definition of “on the basis of sex,” and instead said it took “on the basis of sex”
to mean what they called “the biological binary of male and female that human
beings share with other mammals.”176 Legal challenges to the Trump rule argued
it was contrary to Bostock v. Clayton County, which held that Title VII sex
discrimination protections necessarily encompass LGBTQ discrimination.177 A
judge in the Eastern District of New York has issued a stay on the Trump
Administration’s rule with respect to its definition of sex, as contrary to Bostock
and arbitrary and capricious for having been finalized prior to the Supreme
Court’s Bostock opinion.178
What this long and winding history reveals is a body of civil rights law
continually developing and growing, and sometimes stagnating or regressing,
with each advancement in health reform. As the next Part demonstrates, the next
stages of health reform threaten this progress. Medicare for All, and proposals
similar to it, may create a civil rights vacuum and the legislation will need to be
designed to expressly guarantee at least the status quo with respect to civil rights,
if not to argue for more protective laws. As the final Part suggests, however, this
may create an opportunity for lawmakers to revisit what civil rights in health
care should look like.

II. MEDICARE FOR ALL, HEALTH REFORM, AND THE IMPACT ON CIVIL
RIGHTS LAWS AS THEY APPLY IN HEALTH CARE
Roughly a decade since the passage of the ACA, naturally the focus has
turned to the next stages of health reform. The ACA has had innumerous positive
effects on the health of Americans, driving down uninsured rates and making
health insurance more affordable and accessible for all, but especially for the
sick.179 Yet, the ACA was never designed to be the end point for a number of
reasons, one being that the legislation is not a guarantee of universal care for all
and, even at its best, still approximately ten percent of the population remain
uninsured.180 Moreover, the ACA retains a fragmented health care financing

175. Id. at 944–47.
176. Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities, Delegation of Authority,
85 Fed. Reg. 37,160, 37,178 (June 19, 2020) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 438, 440, 460; 45 C.F.R. pt. 86, 92,
147, 155, 156).
177. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020).
178. Walker v. Azar, No. 20-CV-2834 FBSMG, 2020 WL 4749859 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2020). For
arguments as to why Bostock’s reasoning necessitates the view that Title IX and section 1557 forbid LGBTQ
discrimination, see Amy Post, Ashley Stephens &Valarie Blake, Sex Discrimination in Healthcare: Section 1557
and LGBTQ Rights After Bostock, CAL. L. REV. ONLINE (Jan. 2021), https://www.californialawreview.org/sexdiscrimination-in-healthcare-after-bostock/.
179. Sherry A. Glied, Stephanie Ma & Anaïs Borja, Effect of the Affordable Care Act on Health Care Access,
COMMONWEALTH FUND (May 8, 2017), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2017/
may/effect-affordable-care-act-health-care-access.
180. See Witters, supra note 3.
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system that does little to tackle the inefficiencies that contribute to outsized
health care spending.
A debate has sprung up, on the liberal-leaning side, over whether a singlepayer system or a public option is the preferred next step given that the
Democratic party captured the presidency in 2020. Single-payer systems, now
colloquially referred to as “Medicare for All” after Senator Bernie Sanders’s bill
of that name, typically guarantee health care to all residents of a country, or
perhaps all citizens.181 The government, or some other entity, pools all health
care finances, traditionally through a tax, and pays for all services through a
single, universal program.182 Private insurance is often rendered unnecessary, or
retained only as a supplemental benefit to address any gaps left by the
government plan.183 In contrast, public buy-ins or public options are plans where
the government offers a public insurance plan alongside private insurance and
individuals have the choice whether to purchase one or the other.184 The
government plan is likely to be chosen by those individuals whose needs are not
well met in the private market, but the public option’s rates may still be
competitive with private insurance given low overhead and a large market share
that can bargain down reimbursement rates.185
Medicare for All, and to a lesser degree any plan that move us toward
universal or near-universal federal funding, threatens to wipe out civil rights as
we currently know them in health care. As the brief history of civil rights in
health care suggests, Medicare was the earliest and least protective civil rights
“bill,” but this may be all we are left with after reforms. Medicaid may no longer
exist, and neither may the ACA, though the two undeniably brought additional,
necessary civil rights protections to patients that Medicare did not.
As this Part will demonstrate, civil rights protections may inadvertently
drop out with Medicare for All legislation and will need to be deliberately
drafted back in to any health reform proposal.
First, this Part describes some possible designs of single-payer and public
option proposals, using examples of current legislation introduced to the 116th
Congress. Second, it examines how these proposals will affect the applicability
of civil rights laws to health care settings, all with an aim of ensuring that future

181. See Andrea S. Christopher, Single Payer Healthcare: Pluses, Minuses, and What It Means for You,
HARV. HEALTH PUBL’G, https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/single-payer-healthcare-pluses-minuses-means201606279835 (June 23, 2020) (discussing Jonathan Oberlander, The Virtues and Vices of Single-Payer
Healthcare, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1401 (2016)); Selena Simmons-Duffin, Medicare for All? A Public Option?
Health Care Terms, Explained, NPR (Jan. 14, 2020, 12:38 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2020/01/14/796246568/medicare-for-all-a-public-option-health-care-terms-explained.
182. See Oberlander, supra note 181, at 1403; Simmons-Duffin, supra note 181.
183. See Oberlander, supra note 181, at 1401–02 (discussing the Canadian single-payer healthcare system
and how private insurance polies are “supplemental services not covered by the governmental plan”); SimmonsDuffin, supra note 181.
184. See Simmons-Duffin, supra note 181.
185. See id.
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legislation can offset for any unanticipated and unintended erosion of these
safeguards.
A. HEALTH REFORM PROPOSALS
1.

Medicare for All

There were two single-payer proposals introduced in the 116th Congress.
The most well-known is Medicare for All (S. 1129) introduced by Senator
Bernie Sanders.186 The plan ends Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, TRICARE, the
federal employee health benefit plan, and all private insurance and introduces
the new Medicare for All plan, providing universal health coverage for all
United States residents.187 All United States residents are automatically enrolled
for life at birth, or are enrolled upon eligibility.188 The plan covers
comprehensive health benefits in thirteen categories: inpatient and outpatient
hospital care; ambulatory patient care; primary and preventive care including
care for chronic disease; drugs, devices, and biologics; mental health and
substance abuse treatment; laboratory and diagnostic services; reproductive,
maternity, and newborn care; pediatric care; oral health; short-term
rehabilitative and habilitative services; emergency care and transport; transport
to services for people with disabilities and individuals with low incomes; and
some home and community-based long-term care.189 Medicare for All does not
cover all forms of long-term nursing home care; instead this function remains
with Medicaid and the federal government will provide some matching funds to
the states similar to what it currently does for such services.190
States can provide supplemental benefits at their own expense.191 Private
insurance and employer benefits may also be permitted for benefits not covered
by the universal Medicare for All plan.192 Payments for delivery of services are
made directly from the federal government to the providers.193
S. 1129 dedicates a section to antidiscrimination. It provides that:
(a) IN GENERAL.—No person shall, on the basis of race, color, national
origin, age, disability, or sex, including sex stereotyping, gender identity,
sexual orientation, and pregnancy and related medical conditions (including
termination of pregnancy), be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination by any participating provider as

186. Medicare for All Act of 2019, S. 1129, 116th Cong. (2019).
187. Id. §§ 701(b)(2) (discussing replacement of public plans), 901 (discussing replacement of private
plans).
188. Id. § 105(a).
189. Id. § 201(a).
190. Id. § 204.
191. Id. § 201(d).
192. Id. § 107(b) (“Nothing in this Act shall be construed as prohibiting the sale of health insurance coverage
for any additional benefits not covered by this Act, including additional benefits that an employer may provide
to employees or their dependents, or to former employees or their dependents.”).
193. Id. § 611.
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defined in section 301, or any entity conducting, administering, or funding a
health program or activity, including contracts of insurance, pursuant to this
Act.
(b) CLAIMS OF DISCRIMINATION.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall establish a procedure for
adjudication of administrative complaints alleging a violation of subsection
(a).
(2) JURISDICTION.—Any person aggrieved by a violation of subsection
(a) by a covered entity may file suit in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties.
(3) DAMAGES.—If the court finds a violation of subsection (a), the court
may grant compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory relief, injunctive
relief, attorneys’ fees and costs, or other relief as appropriate.194

This express protection for civil rights in S. 1129 will be discussed in more detail
in Part III.
A second Medicare for All plan (H.R. 1384) was introduced by
Representative Pramila Jayapal.195 H.R. 1384 is very similar to Senator
Sanders’s plan but departs in a few signature ways. One significant difference is
that Representative Jayapal’s plan covers long-term care services under the
federal plan, rather than by retaining Medicaid.196
Specifics may ultimately vary but, generally, a Medicare for All or singlepayer type of proposal will confine all or almost all health care spending to a
single program. Such a plan is likely to end private insurance, or reduce it to a
supplemental role, free of any federal subsidies. Such a program might also
maintain private insurance for some managed care functions.
2.

Public Option Proposals

Public options, or public buy-ins, are plans run through a public program
that individuals have the option to purchase, as opposed to purchasing private
insurance. Most of the proposals put forth in the 116th Congress leave all of the
public programs like Medicare, Medicaid, TRICARE, and CHIP intact and
simply designate one that individuals have the option to purchase into.197 Some
plans allow automatic enrollment in which individuals can opt out of the public
insurance; most are opt-in.198 These plans often vary in which market is used to
create the public option. For instance, plans might expand the Affordable Care
Act’s marketplace, Medicare Part C plans, Medicare, Medicaid, or create

194. Id. § 104.
195. Medicare for All Act of 2019, H.R. 1384, 116th Cong. (2019).
196. Id. § 204.
197. Compare Medicare-for-All and Public Plan Proposals, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/
interactive/compare-medicare-for-all-public-plan-proposals/ (May 15, 2019).
198. See id. For example, Medicare for America Act of 2019, H.R. 2452, 116th Cong. § 101 (2019) is an
opt-out model of a public option.
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entirely new public plans for individuals to buy into.199 Plans also may vary in
who can purchase into them, whether only individuals or also small groups and
employers.200 These plans are more modest than Medicare for All-style plans,
but they have the same general effect of increasing public payments to health
care providers. Individuals or groups pay into the government, and then the
government pays providers for health care services.
These types of plans have received support from some Democratic leaders
on the basis that they represent a more modest reform over single-payer options,
but still expand beyond the reaches of the ACA. Some politicians see such plans
as a bridge between the ACA and single payer, believing that a public option
will prove so successful at competing with private insurers that it may effectively
end private insurance by the public voting with its wallets.201 President Biden is
a supporter of a public option, as opposed to Medicare for All.202 With
Democrats currently lacking a filibuster-proof majority, it is unclear that either
a public option or Medicare for All can pass, absent filibuster reform.203 The two
models remain the short- and long-term health reform strategies of the
Democratic party, however, so they must be examined for their impact on the
larger health care system.
B. THE EFFECTS OF SINGLE-PAYER AND PUBLIC OPTION PROPOSALS ON
CIVIL RIGHTS APPLICABILITY
Single-payer and public option proposals may have an unanticipated and
undesirable effect that will need to be planned for in the legislation. Without
clear legislation stating otherwise, these proposals may roll back protections for
patients from discrimination by providers, from health benefit discrimination,
and from discrimination specifically on the basis of sex. This Subpart discusses
how these new health reform bills could impact the flow of federal financial

199. See Compare Medicare-for-All and Public Plan Proposals, supra note 197.
200. Id.
201. For instance, Senator Elizabeth Warren proposed a public option in her presidential campaign platform
as a bridge to Medicare for All. She noted in an explanation of her approach that
I will fight to pass legislation that would complete the transition to full Medicare for All. By this
point, the American people will have experienced the full benefits of a true Medicare for All option,
and they can see for themselves how that experience stacks up against high-priced care that requires
them to fight tooth-and-nail against their insurance company.
My First Term Plan for Reducing Health Care Costs in America and Transitioning to Medicare for All, WARREN
DEMOCRATS, https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/m4a-transition (last visited Feb. 25, 2021). For ways that a
public option operates as a bridge to Medicare for All, see Sally C. Pipes, Opinion, Fans of Medicare for All
Have an Ally in Biden, BOS. HERALD (Sept. 18, 2020, 5:43 AM), https://www.bostonherald.com/2020/09/
18/fans-of-medicare-for-all-have-an-ally-in-biden/ (“Biden might present himself as an opponent of Medicare
for All. But his policy proposals would pave the way for single-payer in the very near future, whether his fellow
Democrats realize it or not.”).
202. See Health Care, JOE BIDEN, https://joebiden.com/healthcare/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2021).
203. Dylan Scott, The Senate’s Rules Will Make It Really Hard to Pass Medicare-For-All, VOX (Mar. 8,
2019, 10:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/3/8/18251707/medicare-for-all-bill-senatefilibuster-budget-reconciliation-byrd-rule.
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assistance into health care and what this means for civil rights applicability to
health care. Particularly, this Subpart proposes legislative fixes for how to ensure
that any new reforms at least maintain the status quo with respect to civil rights
enforcement.
1. Implications for Nondiscrimination and Health Care Providers
Perhaps most dramatically, a transition to a single-payer or Medicare for
All-type model could effectively end all civil rights obligations for individual
health care providers. Both single-payer plans currently proposed in Congress
expand Medicare and appear to retain the Medicare Parts A through D
framework, or at least some delimitation between provider payments and
institutional care payments via Part A and Part B.
Part B payments, those made to individual providers, continue to be
deemed by HHS not to count as federal financial assistance for purposes of civil
rights statutes.204 This has been the consistent position of HHS almost since
Medicare’s passage.205 When HHS promulgated the section 1557 rule under the
Obama Administration, the Agency admitted that this may not be good policy
but it failed to change it, in part, because it believed nearly all providers would
be covered through other funding streams and, in part, because it did not believe
that the rulemaking process was the appropriate mechanism to overturn its own
long-standing position.206
Indeed, HHS was correct at the time of the implementation of section 1557
that most providers are covered by a form of federal financial assistance,
whether Medicaid, CHIP, or some other federal program.207 The trouble is that
with Medicare for All proposals, all other funding streams would drop off,
leaving only Medicare and thus potentially removing providers from any civil
rights accountability. This is more than a little ironic given that the government
would be funding nearly one hundred percent of all provider services, even more
than it does now, but with zero percent of the civil rights accountability by
providers.
The same effect would likely not be seen with public option plans, since
many of the proposals introduced in the 116th Congress retain Medicare,
Medicaid, and private insurance (including government subsidies to purchase
private insurance on the exchanges for the income-eligible).208 Under these
plans, there is still plenty of other federal financial assistance floating around,
aside from Medicare Part B, to bring providers under civil rights enforcement.209
However, many proponents of these types of proposals tout them as a bridge to
single-payer plans, either legislatively or by reason that the public option plan
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

See supra notes 84–97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 84–97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 158–163 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 158–163 and accompanying text.
See Compare Medicare-for-All and Public Plan Proposals, supra note 197.
Id.
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will be so competitive that it ultimately drives out private payers. To the extent
that any of these proposals create a single federal payer by design or effect, they
may present the same challenge as Medicare for All.
The issue should be planned for at the time of drafting the legislation,
whether Medicare for All or a public option, as health reform, especially in the
current political climate, can make amending laws ex post facto nearly or totally
impossible. The most logical fix would be for any proposals to expressly state
that all funds stemming from the proposal count as federal financial assistance
for purposes of civil rights laws. This is best done in the statute. If the statute is
silent, there is the possibility that rulemakers and the courts could construe the
law in a way that leaves patients unprotected from provider discrimination. Or,
even if the rulemakers try to define those federal funds as federal financial
assistance for purposes of civil rights laws in a rule, they risk being overruled in
a Chevron challenge.210 A court is likely to find the statute as clearly not
including Medicare for All funds as federal financial assistance or see the statute
as ambiguous and find that the agency oversteps because of HHS’s long history
of considering Part B payments to not be federal financial assistance.
2. Implications for Nondiscrimination and Health Care Benefits
Another implication of single-payer or public option proposals is that civil
rights laws may not apply to the government, as the designer and administrator
of health benefits. Admittedly, Medicare for All-style proposals do much to
remove discrimination from the insurance market. There is no cherry-picking in
enrollment, and premiums and cost-sharing, if present, would not vary (except
perhaps by income). Still, what benefits get covered or not could have disparate
effects on certain groups. For instance, a failure of Medicare for All to cover
some forms of gender transition therapy could be viewed as a form of sex
discrimination, or cuts to community-based care could differentially harm the
elderly or people with disabilities.
Medicare as a program, and CMS as the agency administering it, are not
recipients of federal financial assistance for purposes of civil rights laws.
Therefore, Medicare and CMS are not governed by Title IV, Title IX, or the Age
Discrimination Act. The Rehab Act applies to agencies, but it only addresses
disability discrimination.211 Section 1557 of the ACA extends age, race,
disability, and sex antidiscrimination obligations to health programs and
activities including to government agencies like CMS,212 but this law would
seemingly no longer apply once the ACA has been repealed and replaced with a
single-payer system.
210. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). In Chevron, the
Supreme Court created a deference framework for agency interpretations of statutes: first, a statute that is clear
controls; second, a statute that is ambiguous allows for an agency’s reasonable interpretation of Congressional
intent.
211. 29 U.S.C. § 794.
212. 42 U.S.C. § 18116.
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If civil rights laws are to be applicable to Medicare for All legislation, there
are several possible solutions. Probably the best approach is to adopt the model
of section 1557 and clearly state that civil rights laws will apply to “any program
or activity that is administered by an Executive Agency”213 or some similar
language. This would likely be satisfactory to bring in CMS and its Medicare
for All plan; HHS interpreted it to do just that in its Obama-era rule interpreting
section 1557.214 Shy of that, Congress could leave the issue to the regulators or
the courts, but that would be risky, as without expressly stating that CMS is
covered by civil rights laws, the agency or courts are free (and justifiably based
on the text of the law) to find that civil rights laws do not apply to CMS as an
administrator of benefits.215
Alternatively, Medicare for All could continue to rely mainly on
Medicare’s agency process of national and local benefit determinations.216 This
is a proposal worth considering in more detail, but notably civil rights laws do
not foreclose this; they are an extra safeguard and one better designed to reach
claims rooted in discrimination based on protected class.
A Medicare for All style of proposal is also likely to end private insurance
in health care, or to reduce it to a supplemental role.217 Discrimination in this
market is highly probable, absent regulation, as was the case prior to the ACA’s
robust consumer and civil rights protections.218 Any private insurance that
functions like Medicare Parts C or D would continue to be governed by civil
rights law, as a recipient of federal financial assistance.219 However, without
express protections in the law, other forms of private insurance may go
unchecked by civil rights law, as any remaining role of private insurers is likely
to be supplemental and not subsidized by the federal government.220 Lawmakers
will need to consider whether they want to retain any of the ACA market
protections, or civil rights protections that currently apply to the private market
in the absence of receipt of federal funds.

213. Id.
214. “[HHS] is not covered as a federally assisted program, although the Department is covered by the rule
as an administrator of health programs and activities. . . . [A]ll parts of the Medicare program are a health
program or activity. . . .” Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376, 31,383–
85 (May 18, 2016) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92).
215. Note that while the Author believes the language of 42 U.S.C. § 18116 to be clear in extending to
agencies like CMS, the rule under the Trump Administration disagreed and argued that section 1557 only applied
to Title I entities. See Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities, 85 Fed. Reg.
37,160, 37,161–62 (June 19, 2020) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 438, 440, 460; 45 C.F.R. pt. 86, 92, 147, 155,
156).
216. See supra Part I.C.2.Error! Reference source not found..
217. Medicare for All Act of 2019, S. 1129, 116th Cong. § 901 (2019) (discussing replacement of private
plans).
218. See POLLITZ ET AL., supra note 104, at iii–v.
219. OFF. FOR C.R., supra note 81.
220. This is in contrast to private insurers under section 1557, which were expressly governed as recipients
of subsidies. 42 U.S.C. § 18116.
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With public option programs, the same issues may be raised, though the
matter will vary greatly based on the design of the public option. Many public
option proposals offered in the most recent Congress allow for subsidies to
purchase private insurance alongside a public plan.221 In these models, private
insurers would be retained and would be governed by civil rights law, just as is
the case now with the ACA and section 1557 (presuming that the ACA remains
intact and lawmakers simply amend the law to add a public option).222 Any
public options that would remove federal subsidies from private insurance
would remove civil rights applicability, however. Additionally, if the public
option is Medicare or some other federal public program (as opposed to a
Medicaid buy-in), then civil rights laws may not apply to the program as the
administrator of benefits if the ACA is repealed.223 Any proposal should
consider civil rights protections for the beneficiaries who buy into the public
plan, as well as the individuals who remain in private plans. If the public option
proves popular, some providers may find themselves only providing care to
Medicare beneficiaries, effectively freeing those providers from
antidiscrimination mandates, unless the law anticipates and preempts this issue.
3. Implications for Nondiscrimination and Health Care Entities
A shift to Medicare for All is unlikely to significantly change the civil
rights obligations of Part A recipients or hospitals and other health care
institutions. Medicare Part A counts as federal financial assistance in the context
of health care.224 Most hospitals, community health centers, and hospices have
historically been governed by these laws as recipients of Part A funds.225 If
Medicare is expanded, it should leave these obligations unsettled, or else expand
them even further to the rare institution that does not currently accept Medicare
but might be enticed to do so in a Medicare for All system. Public option
proposals would also likely do little to disturb civil rights laws; if anything they
might expand the number of entities receiving federal financial assistance.
4. Implications for Claims Based on Sex Discrimination
Protections against sex discrimination in health care came only with the
adoption of the Affordable Care Act and section 1557. Since then, there has been
a wave of cases challenging discriminatory conduct in health care by providers
and insurers on the basis of sex.226 These protections, however, are purely
221. See Compare Medicare-for-All and Public Plan Proposals, supra note 197.
222. See supra Part I.E.1.
223. See supra Part I.E.1.
224. OFF. FOR C.R., supra note 81.
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., Prescott v. Rady Children’s Hosp., 265 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1097 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (using section
1557 to challenge lack of preferred pronoun use and other discrimination against a transgender teenager);
Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-CV-2037 SRN/FLN, 2015 WL 1197415, at *15–17 (D. Minn. Mar.
16, 2015) (challenging lack of preferred pronoun use and inappropriate genital examinations as discrimination
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derived from the statutory text of section 1557. Absent that, Title IX does not
otherwise apply to health care; it expressly applies only to “any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”227 Moreover, other
protections from sex discrimination only derive from the text of the ACA, such
as its ban on gender rating by health insurers.228 These protections must be
transferred to any reforms that repeal or alter the ACA. For instance, a Medicare
for All bill would not implicitly bring Title IX protections into health care. The
statute would need to expressly provide for these same or greater protections.
None of these issues are insurmountable; most simply require thoughtful
foresight and a Congress that, in passing major health reform, is amenable to
taking minor, proactive steps in the legislation to maintain the status quo with
respect to civil rights laws and their application to health care settings. Absent
these safeguards, though, Medicare for All might mean a health care system that
is more discriminatory than the one that predates it. Moreover, because
lawmakers have to be intentional in including civil rights protections in the
legislation, this is an opportunity for lawmakers to do more, to create a civil
rights provision that reflects historical failings of civil rights in health care and
prepares for better enforcement in the future.

III. LEARNING FROM PAST MISTAKES AND USING MEDICARE FOR ALL AS
THE VEHICLE FOR A MEANINGFUL CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT FOR
PATIENTS
Ultimately, the uncertainty of civil rights under Medicare for All or other
versions of health reform can be turned into an opportunity for positive legal
reforms. Lawmakers will need to address these issues during the drafting of the
legislation, or risk creating a regulatory vacuum where much of the progress of
civil rights in health care is undone.
In prior health reforms, civil rights were an afterthought at best. Civil rights
laws followed from health reform, rather than being considered independent of
it and goals unto themselves. For both Medicare and Medicaid availability of
federal money was simply expanded, and regulators acted in response. The ACA
did contain a health care specific civil rights bill in section 1557 and the
provision did expand protections some, by expressly including agencies and
specifying that subsidies are a form of federal financial assistance.229 Otherwise,

on the basis of sex); Flack v. Wis. Dep’t of Health Servs., 328 F. Supp. 3d 931, 934 (W.D. Wis. 2018)
(challenging an insurer’s ban on gender affirming surgery as sex discrimination under section 1557); Boyden v.
Conlin, 341 F. Supp. 3d 979, 993–94 (W.D. Wis. 2018) (challenging a ban on gender affirming surgery by an
employer-sponsored plan as violating section 1557 and Title VII).
227. 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
228. Note that the ACA does not explicitly ban gender rating. It imposes community ratings except with
respect to a couple of attributes: family size, geography, age, and whether one smokes. In this way, it in indirectly
bans premium differentiation based on sex. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg.
229. See supra Part I.E.
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section 1557 of the ACA said very little beyond the fact that the four relevant
civil rights statutes would apply.230
Legislators have the opportunity to be the architects of this new civil rights
bill, as they have no choice but to consider deliberately what counts as federal
financial assistance, who the covered entities should be, and what groups
warrant protection. Legislators thus have the opportunity to grapple with how
civil rights should apply in a health care setting.
This Part first considers whether legislation should adopt a traditional civil
rights framework or venture beyond. It also clarifies the importance of
designating the civil rights provision of the law as unique to health care, as this
may be important for enforcement where the law is unclear. Lastly, it provides
specific areas where the legislation may enhance civil rights protections beyond
their current reach, as well as acknowledging some political pitfalls.
A. ADOPTING A TRADITIONAL CIVIL RIGHTS FRAMEWORK OR TRYING
SOMETHING NEW?
One notable aspect of section 1557 was that it simply extended existing
civil rights jurisprudence into health care, rather than creating a new framework
for health care nondiscrimination. Take section 1557’s prohibition on sex
discrimination as one example of the issue. It stated that Title IX would now
apply to health care programs that were recipients of federal financial
assistance.231 In doing so, it brought in all of Title IX’s statutory, regulatory, and
case law meaning to bear in considering what constitutes sex discrimination
under the ACA.
In contrast to this, consider S. 1129’s antidiscrimination provision, which
instead specifies which groups of people will be protected from discrimination,
without any reference to specific civil rights laws.232 For instance, S. 1129 bans
discrimination based on sex, gender identity, and sexual orientation.233 This may
leave an opening for regulators or the courts to decipher whether or not Title IX
applies, or whether the law forbids sex discrimination in some different and
unique way that is divorced from the body of law that interprets Title IX.
Now of course this may simply be a mistake of the drafters, and one that
can easily be remedied by the time such a law would be passed. However, it does

230. See supra Part I.E.
231. 42 U.S.C. § 18116.
232. See Medicare for All Act of 2019, S. 1129, 116th Cong. § 104(a) (2019).
No person shall, on the basis of race, color, national origin, age, disability, or sex, including sex
stereotyping, gender identity, sexual orientation, and pregnancy and related medical conditions
(including termination of pregnancy), be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination by any participating provider as defined in section 301, or any
entity conducting, administering, or funding a health program or activity, including contracts of
insurance, pursuant to this Act.
Id.
233. Id.
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represent a real choice for lawmakers. Do they want to create a truly healthspecific brand of nondiscrimination or do they want to apply traditional civil
rights to health care? And if the latter, are there aspects of traditional civil rights
laws they want to reject when it comes to health care for discrete health policy
reasons?
Creating a new brand of nondiscrimination law seems frighteningly
complicated and, absent clear direction, rulemakers and the courts are likely to
simply apply traditional civil rights norms anyway. But on the other hand, one
advantage is the opportunity to argue for a rationale of greater safeguards when
civil rights laws fall short. For instance, section 1557 ties its ban on sex
discrimination to Title IX and, in doing so, it is at the mercy of the courts whether
the law encompasses gender identity discrimination or not.234 Of course
rulemakers may interpret broadly but, absent congressional guidance, this can
be subject to change from administration to administration. Even the Obama-era
rulemakers who sought expansive protections under section 1557 would not
state that the rule categorically reached sexual orientation discrimination per se,
as they felt they were reaching beyond Title IX case law, likely subjecting
themselves to legal challenge.235 Their inclusion of gender identity and
pregnancy determination in the definition of “on the basis of sex” was
challenged and ultimately vacated on Administrative Procedure Act and
Religious Freedom Restoration Act grounds.236 In contrast, S. 1129 simply
proscribes gender identity discrimination;237 it is not reliant on what sex
discrimination means in Title IX or Title VII contexts and so can be more
protective and more certain of how the law will be interpreted in future.
Perhaps the safest course is a compromise tying the statute to traditional
civil rights laws but clearly identifying areas where there is a departure. For
instance, in order to define in the statute what sex discrimination means for
purposes of that law, the statute might state that Title IX applies. But, it could
also state that discrimination is prohibited on the basis of sex, sex stereotyping,
sexual orientation, gender identity, pregnancy termination, and so on.
B. MAKING MEDICARE FOR ALL A HEALTH CARE-SPECIFIC CIVIL RIGHTS
BILL
No matter how clear and specific the statute may be, there will always be
room for interpretation by agencies and by the courts. How the courts responded
to section 1557 may be informative for this issue. Particularly, in interpreting
unclear provisions, the courts seemed concerned with whether section 1557 was
meant to be a health care-specific civil rights bill—that is, did Congress intend

234.
235.
236.
237.

See supra notes 168–173 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 168–173 and accompanying text.
Franciscan All., Inc. v. Azar, 414 F. Supp. 3d. 928, 945–46 (N.D. Tex. 2019).
S. 1129 § 104.
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the statute to play by its own rules, or did Congress intend for civil rights in this
context to be treated like civil rights in any other context?
Take the question of whether there is a private right of action under section
1557. Section 1557, in its framing, gave courts and rule makers the opportunity
to consider it as a unique and health care specific civil rights bill. In stating that
four different civil rights laws all applied to health care programs and activities,
it left courts to untangle whether the enforcement mechanisms for each of these
civil rights statutes applied or whether there was one single enforcement scheme
for section 1557, regardless of whether the underlying claim was based in race,
age, sex, or disability discrimination. The statute itself was not particularly
helpful, with vague and confusing language: “The enforcement mechanisms
provided for and available under such title VI, title IX, section 794, or such
Age Discrimination Act shall apply for purposes of violations of this subsection.”238
Professor Sidney Watson argued effectively that section 1557 creates a
new health-specific anti-discrimination prohibition that reaches further than
Title VI, prohibiting discrimination not only in federally funded health
programs but also federally administered health programs and new ACAauthorized entities like Exchanges. Section 1557 does not merely extend Title
VI to additional health programs; it creates a new civil right and remedy while
leaving in place Title VI and other existing civil rights laws.
Section 1557 relies on familiar language from Title VI and other federal civil
rights statutes that have established legal meanings, which is evidence of the
Congressional intent that this new civil rights statute is to prohibit both
intentional and disparate impact discrimination.239

Particularly, Watson argued that because section 1557 is health care
specific, and independent of other civil rights, this should have implications for
how it is enforced, including whether it permits a private right of action and
when other applications of civil rights laws may not.240
Courts were split on this issue of whether section 1557 effectively overrode
Alexander v. Sandoval for purposes of health care discrimination, allowing
private rights of action alleging disparate impact for each of the underlying
grounds that section 1557 reached.241 At least one court was compelled by the
narrative that the law meant for health care to be treated differently, observing
that “it appears that Congress intended to create a new, health-specific, antidiscrimination cause of action that is subject to a singular standard, regardless
of a plaintiff’s protected class status.”242 In contrast, another court did not

238. 42 U.S.C. § 18116.
239. Watson, supra note 70, at 870.
240. Id.
241. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
242. Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-CV-2037 SRN/FLN, 2015 WL 1197415, at *11 (D. Minn.
Mar. 16, 2015) (footnote omitted).
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conclude that Congress clearly demonstrated such intent, noting instead that
“[Section 1557] does not change the nature of those grounds any more than it
adds a new form of discrimination.”243 The rulemakers under the Obama
Administration ultimately interpreted section 1557 as:
authorizing a private right of action for claims of disparate impact
discrimination on the basis of any of the criteria enumerated in the legislation.
At the same time, OCR is incorporating its existing procedures for its
administrative processing of complaints; thus, we will use our current
processes to address age discrimination on the one hand and race, color,
national origin, sex, or disability on the other hand. This approach will enable
us to be consistent in our processing of complaints under OCR’s other
authorities in instances where we have concurrent jurisdiction under Section
1557 and the other civil rights laws it references.244

In essence, the regulation permitted a single, health care specific standard
for private rights of action. For purposes of agency enforcement, HHS retained
the enforcement mechanisms for each of the four statutes, as it is responsible for
enforcing section 1557 and the other underlying civil rights laws.245 HHS under
the Trump Administration stated it would not take a position on whether section
1557 permits private rights of action or not, effectively leaving the matter to the
courts.246
All of this serves as a useful example of the importance of Congress
designating whether it wants special rules to apply in health care. Of course,
ideally, if Congress does, it will explicitly state what those rules are. But short
of that, Congress can express a clear intent in the purpose, findings, and even
text of the statute to demonstrate that the civil rights provision is unique from
traditional civil rights law and designed to be protective of patients.

Reading Section 1557 otherwise would lead to an illogical result, as different enforcement
mechanisms and standards would apply to a Section 1557 plaintiff depending on whether the
plaintiff’s claim is based on her race, sex, age, or disability. For instance, a plaintiff bringing a
Section 1557 race discrimination claim could allege only disparate treatment, but plaintiffs
bringing Section 1557 age, disability, or sex discrimination claims could allege disparate treatment
or disparate impact.
Id.
243. Doe v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc., 926 F.3d 235, 238–40 (6th Cir. 2019) (applying Chevron
deference and concluding that HHS overreached in permitting a private right of action for all four grounds
pursuant to section 1557 under prong 1 of Chevron because the original statute was clear; then holding that
whether there is a private right of action depends on the jurisprudence of each of the four grounds as section
1557).
244. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376, 31,440 (May 18, 2016) (to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92).
245. See id. at 31,378.
246. See Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities, Delegation of
Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. 37,160, 37,203 (June 19, 2020) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 438, 440, 460; 45 C.F.R.
pt. 86, 92, 147, 155, 156).
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C. CONSIDERING SPECIFIC PROTECTIONS FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER
MEDICARE FOR ALL
In Part II.B, this Article explored the ways that Medicare for All and other
reforms could unravel existing civil rights protections and how to retain the
status quo in drafting the legislation. This Subpart provides some examples of
opportunities where Medicare for All could build on and go beyond the status
quo, to continue in the tradition of other health reforms in expanding civil rights
for patients one bill at a time. Many of these issues have been briefly touched on
earlier, as they represent current weaknesses in the existing applicability of civil
rights law to health care.
1. Protected Classes
A civil rights provision under Medicare for All is free to define who it
intends to shield from discrimination in health care.
As discussed in Part III.A, this may include enumerating what specific
classes are covered by the law; for instance, not just listing sex discrimination,
but defining what sex discrimination encompasses, such as gender identity and
sexual orientation.
Lawmakers also have a decision to make about whether to include more
groups of people than have traditionally been protected in the past. For example,
Professors Jessica Roberts and Elizabeth Weeks have detailed discrimination by
employers, health providers, insurers and others on the basis of health status, a
form of discrimination not typically protected by civil rights laws.247 Likewise,
scholars point to obesity as a condition that drives discrimination and for which
legal protections are absent.248 Currently, health care providers are free to refuse
to treat patients on these bases: a surgeon may object to treating a particularly
difficult case for fear of a bad outcome hurting the surgeon’s reputation or a
primary care physician might refuse to treat an obese patient because of outright
prejudice.
This creates an opportunity to match civil rights protections with the
literature on who suffers from discrimination in health care settings. Of course,
there may be tradeoffs with this approach and there may be good reason to stick
to the conventional protected classes. For one, these groups and others do not
have civil rights laws that apply to them, leaving uncertainty about how to
enforce laws to protect them.249 Still, this is a matter that lawmakers can
consider. As a single-payer system, the federal government has the prerogative
247. See generally JESSICA L. ROBERTS & ELIZABETH WEEKS, HEALTHISM: HEALTH-STATUS
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW (2018) (establishing a framework for considering when discrimination based on
health status should and should not be permitted under the law).
248. Rebecca M. Puhl & Chelsea A. Heuer, The Stigma of Obesity: A Review and Update, 17 OBESITY 941,
944 (2009) (“In a study of over 620 primary care physicians, >50% viewed obese patients as awkward,
unattractive, ugly, and noncompliant. One-third . . . characterized obese patients as weak-willed, sloppy, and
lazy.”).
249. See supra Part III.A.
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to design the health care system in the way it sees fit. If it is to finance all health
care, it might be concerned with making sure that care is equal, of high quality,
and does not further health and health care disparities that ultimately become the
problem of the federal government.
2. Covered Parties
Lawmakers also have the opportunity to revisit which parties must comply
with civil rights laws under a Medicare for All bill. Section 1557 expressly
included recipients of federal subsidies in the statute to guarantee that subsidies
would be considered a form of federal financial assistance, such that private
insurers would be governed by civil rights.250 A Medicare for All bill also has
the opportunity to plan for broader reach of civil rights laws. Indeed, as Part II.B
demonstrates, lawmakers must expressly enumerate some groups like providers
and CMS, clarify what counts as federal financial assistance, or risk that these
groups will not be captured by civil rights laws at all.
The current version of nondiscrimination in S. 1129 broadly applies to “any
participating provider . . . or any entity conducting, administering, or funding a
health program or activity, including contracts of insurance.”251 Participating
providers are defined in the statute to mean any individual or entity that provides
covered services (and meets other administrative criteria like being party to a
participation agreement under Medicare for All).252 The requirement to comply
with nondiscrimination laws appears to attach to the individual or entity by
virtue of being a participating provider, rather than a recipient of federal
financial assistance.253 Again, this is a departure from traditional civil rights
laws.
Another issue will be whether and to what extent a public insurance
program should be held to account for complying with civil rights laws. S.
1129’s nondiscrimination mandate applies to those that administer or fund
programs, likely capturing CMS, or whatever agency is tasked with designing
health benefits.254 Likewise, section 1557 applies to agencies.255 However, other
civil rights laws like Title IV and Title IX do not apply to agencies, only
recipients of federal funds. A program like Medicare for All will have to balance
equality, cost-savings, and other factors. Certainly, while civil rights laws
250. 42 U.S.C. § 18116; see supra Part I.E.1.
251. Medicare for All Act of 2019, S. 1129, 116th Cong. § 104 (2019).
252. Id. § 301.
253. Note that the bill includes recipients of “contracts of insurance” as covered parties. Id. This is likely
not clear enough language to guarantee that health care provider receiving Part B are covered under the law,
since section 1557 also included this language and still the regulators excluded Part B payments for enforcement.
See 45 C.F.R. § 92.1 (2019); see also supra Part I.E.2. The issue is more critical here, though, where they may
be no other funds that bring providers under government enforcement.
254. S. 1129 § 104 (the nondiscrimination provision applies to “any entity conducting, administering, or
funding a health program or activity, including contracts of insurance”).
255. 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (explaining that the nondiscrimination mandate applies to “any program or
activity that is administered by an Executive Agency or any entity established under this title (or amendments)”).
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clearly extend to Medicaid as an administrator of benefits, courts have been
reluctant to be overly proscriptive in how this influences health benefit design.
For instance, in Alexander v. Choate, the Court, even while worrying about the
disparate impact of budget cuts on people with disabilities, was hesitant to tell
Medicaid officials that they must entirely counter this in their administration of
health benefits.256 The Court noted that:
But nothing in the pre- and post-1973 legislative discussion of § 504 suggests
that Congress desired to make major inroads on States’ longstanding
discretion to choose the proper mix of amount, scope, and duration limitations
on services covered by state Medicaid. And more generally, we have already
stated that § 504 does not impose a general NEPA-like requirement on federal
grantees. . . . On the contrary, to require that the sort of broad-based
distributive decision at issue in this case always be made in the way most
favorable, or least disadvantageous, to the handicapped, even when the same
benefit is meaningfully and equally offered to them, would be to impose a
virtually unworkable requirement on state Medicaid administrators.257

Likewise, Olmstead was largely a victory for people with disabilities as the
Court held that states had to find ways to ensure that individuals were given
access to home- and community-based care.258 However, even there the Court
gave states space to achieve the goal over time, within their discretion and
budget:
Sensibly construed, the fundamental-alteration component of the reasonablemodifications regulation would allow the State to show that, in the allocation
of available resources, immediate relief for the plaintiffs would be inequitable,
given the responsibility the State has undertaken for the care and treatment of
a large and diverse population of persons with mental disabilities.259

This Article reserves this weighty question for another day and simply
suggests that Medicare for All will change applicability of civil rights to health
benefits. However, it is worth emphasizing that if the goal of civil rights law is,
as President Kennedy intended, not to use federal money to further
discrimination,260 then it seems unwise to allow the whole of health care
financing in the United States to go entirely unchecked by civil rights, especially
given the significant health and health care disparities that persist over time for
so many vulnerable groups.261 Civil rights likely should play some role in
ensuring equality in access to health benefits. Lawmakers may want to consider
how the courts have responded to this issue in the past and whether they need to
provide more guidance in the law for how the courts and regulators should
approach this issue when interpreting and applying the law.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 298–99, 302–04 (1985).
Id. at 307–08 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999).
Id. at 604.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.
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3. Government Enforcement
Medicare for All may require the government to also rethink how it
enforces civil rights laws.
If Congress believes that civil rights should apply within benefit design, a
bill would need to consider the best way to address nondiscrimination here. One
idea is a complaint process that could be preserved for individuals who believe
that benefits determinations discriminate against them on the basis of protected
class.262 Additionally, a Medicare for All bill might establish an administrative
process whereby the original benefit design offered by Medicare and any
changes are scrutinized by a designated committee made up of physicians, civil
rights experts, government officials, and patient advocates including
representatives from protected classes. This may help to cut down on complaints
about inequities in benefits if the benefit design is evaluated, at the outset and
periodically, for inequalities.
A Medicare for All bill can also reconsider traditional enforcement
strategies under civil rights. S. 1129’s nondiscrimination provision does not
clearly adopt HHS’s enforcement of other civil rights laws.263 Other civil rights
laws, to the extent federal financial assistance derives from the Agency, are
enforced by HHS’s OCR and involve a complaint process, investigations, the
opportunity for informal or formal resolution, and the possibility of terminating
federal financial assistance for noncompliance.264 S. 1129 instead provides
deference to the Secretary to “establish a procedure for adjudication of
administrative complaints alleging a violation of [the nondiscrimination
provision].”265 The Secretary, likely, would model agency enforcement off of
other civil rights laws and delegate the enforcement of HHS’s OCR, although
there may be merits to considering new models of enforcement.
If lawmakers are compelled by the idea that Medicare for All can be a true
reset for civil rights in health care, then they might also consider how active the
government should be in enforcing civil rights laws, and whether this requires a
redesign of the existing civil rights agency under HHS, or at least its funding.
Professor David Barton Smith recalls the era immediately after the passage of
Medicare when civil rights enforcement by HHS seemed unstoppable.266
Important lessons from the time can inform the next chapter of civil rights in
health care.
In a rapid clip, the Office of Equal Health Opportunity (OEHO) was
established under the Surgeon General’s Office of the Public Health Service to
manage enforcement of Title IV in the rollout of Medicare certification of

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

This is similar to current enforcement of civil rights laws. See supra Part I.A.
See Medicare for All Act of 2019, S. 1129, 116th Cong. § 104 (2019).
See supra Part I.A.4.
S. 1129 § 104(b)(1).
SMITH, supra note 74, at 96–126.
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hospitals.267 Seven hundred and fifty employees from other parts of HEW were
diverted to OEHO; they faced a daunting task of enrolling twenty million seniors
into Medicare while ensuring that hospitals racially integrated.268
What ensued was a game of chicken: the Surgeon General published
standards in the American Hospital’s Associations’ journal and mailed forms to
every hospital, asking them to fill out an assurance of compliance with Title
VI—while genuinely not knowing whether hospitals would comply or not.269
The team tirelessly plugged away, giving guidance to hospital after hospital
about how to comply with the new Title IV.270 When two hospitals in a town in
North Carolina, one white and one black, telegrammed asking how to comply
with Title VI, they received a one-word telegram in response: “Merge.”271
In contrast with the enforcement of civil rights laws by OCR today, OEHO
sent boots on the ground to see that hospitals were integrating and built
relationships with employees and community members who would report back
on progress when agency officials left.272
OEHO was to later run up against significant roadblocks.273 By the time
the Agency got around to desegregation efforts in nursing homes, most of the
workers who had been loaned to OEHO had been sent back to their original
assignments, and President Johnson seemed satisfied with nursing homes
providing paper reassurances, with no on-the-ground enforcement to ensure that
the nursing homes were doing what they promised.274 Then, DHEW’s general
counsel interpreted the law so as not to apply to the some 150,000 office-based
physicians who received Medicare funds, both because the agency did not know
how to handle the sheer volume of enforcement, and because it feared a fight
with organized medicine.275 De-centralization of funds, in particular, had
protected the OEHO from budget cuts by members of Congress that would have
preferred to slow or stop the civil rights agenda.276 But eventually southern
Congressmen that were opposed to civil rights and fed up with OEHO’s agenda
pushed to dissolve it and to form the more centralized and more toothless Office
267. As Smith notes, OEHO’s
life would be a remarkably short one for a bureaucratic agency, less than two years, but long on
accomplishments. For many of the civil servants who worked for the Office of Equal Health
Opportunity during this period, it was the high point of their careers and a period that they looked
back to with pride and more than a little nostalgia.
Id. at 128.
268. This occurred during a time when desegregation was facing hurdles in other areas of American life.
Lunch counters had yet to be fully desegregated and the government had been exhausting resources waging a
war with schools in the South. See id. at 128–32.
269. Id. at 129–32.
270. Id. at 135–40.
271. Id. at 137.
272. Id. at 135–40.
273. Id. at 143–87.
274. Id. at 160.
275. See supra Part I.C.2.b.
276. SMITH, supra note 74, at 164–66.
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of Civil Rights.277 Everyone involved knew that a centralized OCR could be
more easily controlled by Congress, through reduced appropriation.278 Since
then, civil rights enforcement has declined and some lay the blame at the feet of
an understaffed and under-resourced OCR.279 OCR has also been tasked with
HIPAA enforcement, which diverts critical resources away from civil rights.280
The lessons of OEHO for a Medicare for All bill are at least threefold. One,
special times call for special measures. The government was able to go almost
overnight from no civil rights enforcement to deploying a fully staffed
department dedicated to civil rights enforcement.281 They would achieve what
became the most aggressive enforcement ever in the history of health care civil
rights in this country; no later measures were to match that earliest and best
accomplishment.282 It shows how much progress can be attained when the
government prioritizes civil rights. Two, Smith observes that the story of OEHO
also shows that it is far easier to refuse to give money in the first place than to
take it away later.283 The government set forth clear terms in how it would
interpret Title VI for Medicare-participating hospitals, and no hospital would
receive the money until it demonstrated its compliance.284 What was far more
challenging was when a hospital later lagged in its compliance.285 Then, the
agency got tangled up in the administrative processes of investigating, seeking
informal or formal resolution, participating in hearings, and terminating
funds.286 Three, OEHO didn’t solve every problem. Instead, it focused on some
specific inequalities that it believed it could immediately budge.287
What this may signal to lawmakers is that now is the time, at the
brainstorming and drafting and passage of the law stage, to place strict
expectations on participants. Now is the time to be robust about civil rights
protections, to adopt a take-it-or-leave-it approach. Moreover, it suggests that to
see meaningful change in civil rights there may need to be a stronger effort on
the part of the government with respect to enforcement than currently exists.
This may require a reconfiguration of OCR or, at minimum, an increase of

277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Louise G. Trubek & Maya Das, Achieving Equality: Healthcare Governance in Transition, 29 AM. J.
L. & MED. 395, 398–99 (2003) (criticizing OCR over the decades for failing to build on its enforcement
procedures for Title VI).
280. HIPAA complaints number in the tens of thousands per year. Health Information Privacy Complaints
Received by Calendar Year, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/compliance-enforcement/data/complaints-received-by-calendar-year/index.html (Mar. 30, 2020).
281. SMITH, supra note 74, at 128–29.
282. Matthew, supra note 53, at 806–14 (characterizing Title VI enforcement as on a backslide after
desegregation of hospitals).
283. SMITH, supra note 74, at 159.
284. Id. at 128–29.
285. Id. at 159.
286. Id. at 96–142 (profiling the narrow focus on desegregation of hospitals, before turning to other entities
and other discriminatory practices).
287. Id. at 128–29.
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funding and staff to that agency to achieve these important aims and to strike
while the iron is hot. Lastly, under a Medicare for All system, regulators should
be prepared to think about what the greatest inequities currently are in the
system. That is where the battle for civil rights enforcement under Medicare for
All should begin (but not end).
4. Private Enforcement
It is impossible to discuss civil rights without mentioning the erosion the
courts have had on their enforcement, particularly by the limiting of private
rights of action under Alexander v. Sandoval.288 Ultimately, it made civil rights
claims much more challenging for litigants and left a number of discriminatory
behaviors to the whims of enforcement by a federal government that has
fluctuated in its dedication to civil rights enforcement from administration to
administration.289
Medicare for All is an opportunity to specifically outline greater rights for
litigants. Section 1557 was not very clear about this matter. Rulemakers under
the Obama Administration first interpreted the law robustly as allowing private
rights of action for all four civil rights laws, but the Trump Administration
eroded this in its rule.290 This shows the risk of leaving the matter to the
rulemaking process. With Medicare for All, lawmakers can be clear that,
whatever the civil rights protections are, private rights of action (including for
disparate impact) are permitted. Lawmakers can also be explicit in whether
certain types of damages should or should not be allowed under private claims.
For instance, S. 1129 expressly details private rights and provides greater
protection than traditional civil rights law.291 The provision is silent on private
rights of action alleging disparate impact, except to say that individuals will have
jurisdiction in federal courts—but this is a matter the lawmakers can easily
amend to clarify the issue by statute.292 S. 1129 also expressly permits
“compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory relief, injunctive relief,
attorneys’ fees and costs, or other relief as appropriate,”293 expanding damages
beyond those that are traditionally allowed under civil rights laws.294
In short, lawmakers have the opportunity with a Medicare for All bill, or
public option, to remake civil rights in a way that is more protective of patients.
They can be informed by past failures of civil rights laws and by the gaps in

288. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001); see also Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note
43, at 238–39, 244 (depicting a limited reach for civil rights in the aftermath of Sandoval).
289. Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 43, at 243–44.
290. See supra Part III.B.
291. Medicare for All Act of 2019, S. 1129, 116th Cong. § 104 (2019).
292. See id.
293. Id.
294. Civil rights laws typically permit monetary damages with a showing of deliberate indifference. They
typically do not permit punitive damages, however, so this represents a greater remedy for plaintiffs. See supra
Part I.A.4.
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Medicare, Medicaid, and section 1557 in drafting a civil rights bill that is finally
crafted with the unique needs of patients and health care in mind.
D. POLITICAL REALITIES
There may be significant pushback to the inclusion of robust civil rights
protections in a Medicare for All bill. Smith details similar pushback during the
early enforcement of Title VI after the passage of Medicare and Medicaid,
noting that “imposing any kind of Title VI requirements on medical practices
was inconceivable. Local medical societies, state societies, and the AMA were
powerful political forces and reluctant, if not openly hostile, participants in the
Medicare program.”295 However, such pushback may take a different shape and
may be less significant than in the 1960s.296 For one, under Medicare, individual
providers at least had a choice and could forgo those funds in favor of private
pay if they did not want to be held to account for complying with civil rights
laws. Hospitals found the money too enticing not to take the bargain.297
Providers today, in the face of a Medicare for All, may be more like hospitals,
so they will have to choose to work within the Medicare for All system or select
a perhaps very small or nonexistent private system. It certainly would not be a
sympathetic or popular position for any organized medical group or provider to
take today to be opposed to the robustness of civil rights protections, as
compared with the political and social climate of the mid-1960s.
Of course, this could translate into greater pushback from providers against
the adoption of Medicare for All or public option generally. Early evidence
suggests that there may be growing support among health care providers for such
reforms. The American Medical Association (AMA) was virulently opposed to
single-payer health care for almost a century.298 They were credited with
destroying Franklin D. Roosevelt’s push for a single-payer system as part of the
New Deal.299 In the 1960s they organized the major opposition to Medicare,
even having Ronald Reagan record an LP opposing it.300 The AMA eventually
came out in support of the ACA, however, losing a number of conservative

295. SMITH, supra note 74, at 162 (discussing how this became the basis for HEW’s tortured rationale to
exclude Part B from the definition of federal financial assistance).
296. See id. at 96–142 (discussing different health care actors’ responses to civil rights enforcement in the
aftermath of the passage of Medicare).
297. See id.
298. Susannah Luthi, AMA Exits Partnership Fighting Medicare for All, Public Options, MOD.
HEALTHCARE (Aug. 15, 2019, 5:55 PM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/medicare/ama-exits-partnershipfighting-medicare-all-public-options.
299. Id.
300. Avik Roy, Ronald Reagan’s Advice on Health Reform, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2011, 9:29 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2011/02/06/ronald-reagans-advice-on-health-reform/#5dbfa
4f09a8f. The recording was designed for Operation Coffee Cup, a movement led by the AMA in which doctors’
wives held coffee meetings “in order to persuade their friends to write letters to Congress in opposition” to
Medicare. Id.

824

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:773

members in that process.301 At the AMA’s last annual meeting, the AMA’s
house of delegates (its policy-making branch) almost voted to overturn the
AMA’s position opposing single-payer health care, with 47% voting to end it
and 53% voting to retain it.302 The organization also withdrew from the
Partnership for America’s Health Care Future, the lobbying group that runs
opposition ads against single-payer health reform.303 The American College of
Physicians, meanwhile, has come out in support of a Medicare for All plan.304
Couple this with single-payer type systems enjoying wider public support than
in the past:305 a majority of the American public (56%) favors a Medicare for
All plan, and an even larger portion (68%) favors a public option.306 Likely one
of the greatest forces in opposition to Medicare for All or a public option would
be insurers, and these insurers would not be focused on civil rights enforcement
but, instead, the legislation itself and its implications for their services.
Undeniably, civil rights movements often encounter pushback,307 but here
the greater controversy is likely to be a Medicare for All or public option bill
itself, not any civil rights protections it brings with it. If Medicare for All or a
public option can overcome the obstacles that they will undoubtedly face, it
seems of little risk to ensure that the legislation brings with it the most robust
civil rights protections possible.

CONCLUSION
Medicare for All would represent unprecedented progress for patients in
accessing the health care system, but the law could leave us with fewer civil
rights protections, absent careful planning to bake safeguards into the
legislation. By requiring lawmakers to deliberately assure civil rights
protections, Medicare for All enables a conversation and a rethinking of what
civil rights health care can achieve and how lawmakers can draft a law that is
protective of all patients, including members of protected classes. Opportunities
for health reform the likes of Medicare for All may never come again. That bill

301. Harris Meyer, AMA Conservatives Revolt Against the Individual Mandate, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Nov.
30, 2010), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20101130.008103/full/. For more on the history of
the AMA and health reform, see id.
302. Dylan Scott, The Nation’s Most Prominent Doctors Group Almost Dropped Its Opposition to
Medicare-for-All, VOX (June 12, 2019, 11:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/6/12/
18662722/ama-medicare-for-all-single-payer-vote-2020.
303. Luthi, supra note 298. While the President of the AMA stated that this was not a reversal of the
organization’s opposition to single payer health care, it nevertheless suggests that the AMA may at minimum
not be strongly opposed to such reforms. See id.
304. Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, The American College of Physicians’ Endorsement of
Single-Payer Reform: A Sea Change for the Medical Profession, 172 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. S60, S60 (2020).
305. Lunna Lopes, Liz Hamel, Audrey Kearney & Mollyann Brodie, KFF Health Tracking Poll—January
2020: Medicare-for-All, Public Option, Health Care Legislation and Court Actions, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan.
30, 2020), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/kff-health-tracking-poll-january-2020/.
306. Id.
307. See SMITH, supra note 74, at 143–87.
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could be the chance to ensure that the civil rights of patients are respected and
protected well into the future.
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